The Impact of Climate Change on Health Expenditures

by

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Abstract

We study the effect of climate-induced health risks within a continuous time OLG economy with a realistic demography and endogenous mortality. Climate change impacts the economy through two channels. First, a degrading environmental quality increases mortality, affecting the demand for health care. Second, production losses are caused through deteriorating climate conditions and lead to reductions in income. We explore how individuals respond to these climate change impacts with respect to their life-cycle decisions and assess the overall effect on aggregate health care demand. We put special focus on age-specific vulnerabilities of climate-induced health risks and explore the response to climate change across age-groups. We solve the model numerically and show that health care demand is subject to two opposing forces. While climate-induced mortality increases demand for medical care, reduced income tends to lower health spending, particularly among the elderly. Moreover, we find that age-specific vulnerabilities to climate change considerably shape the effect on aggregate health care demand. Our analysis, thus, highlights the important role of a full life-cycle perspective in the estimation of climate-induced health costs.

Keywords: climate change, climate-induced health risks, life-cycle model, health care, value of life.
JEL-Classification: D91, I12, I15, J11, J17, Q54.

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1 Introduction

The recently published report by the Lancet Commission, see Watts et al. [2015], has named climate change an unacceptably high and potentially catastrophic risk to human health. While a large body of literature is indicating that this risk is already felt today, worsening conditions are predicted for the future. Climate change is also likely to have strong effects on mortality. For example, the WHO estimates additional 250,000 annual deaths related to climate change by 2030, see WHO [2014]. These deaths can be caused directly by climate change through more frequent extreme weather events including heat stress, floods and storms but also indirectly through water inaccessibility, spread of diseases and food insecurity. Developing countries are expected to be affected most severely, nonetheless, the developed world is also likely to suffer impacts on human health.[1] These health-related risks can have important economic spillovers, particularly on individual life-cycle planning of savings and medical care expenses but also on the aggregate health care demand on a population level. Moreover, climate change is expected to have direct negative economic consequences such as output losses, which itself will affect the income, and consequently the life-cycle decisions of individuals. Against this background, this paper explores the effect of climate-induced mortality and economic impacts on the individual life-cycle as well as on aggregate health expenditures. We do so by integrating climate change into a life-cycle model embedded in an overlapping generation structure.

First and foremost, this paper is related to studies that attempt to quantify the effect of climate change on medical expenditures. For example, Bosello et al. [2006] estimate the economic impacts of climate-induced health effects and find that health care expenditures will rise in those regions where health impacts are negative. Within the EU, a study by Watkiss et al. [2009] found a net cost of heat-induced health effects for the last decades of the 21st century, while in the prior period the reduction in cold-related mortality amounted to an economic benefit. Hutton [2011] provides a review of various studies estimating global costs of climate change adaptation, including costs that accrue in the health care sector. The studies in the survey generally find large increases in global health expenditures caused by global warming.

In all of these studies the demand for health care is, however, assumed to be linked quite mechanically with mortality as health care costs are derived as the product of disease cases and the unit cost of health interventions. Hence, the demand for health care is not embedded into a life-cycle optimization, so that these studies miss important mechanisms through which changes in life-expectancy and income feed back in health care demand. Moreover, there has been growing evidence that effects of environmental changes on health are not uniformly distributed across all age-groups. For example, Basu and Samet [2002] and Haines et al. [2006] argue that heat extremes affect mostly the elderly population due to higher vulnerability to cardiovascular diseases. By contrast, younger age groups suffer relatively more through malnutrition and vector-borne diseases (Haines et al. [2006]). Given that health expenditures vary strongly by age, vulnerabilities to various health risks across age-groups are likely to influence the effect on climate-related medical costs.

Despite effects on human health, climate change is prone to have negative effects on economic performance such as through reduced labor productivity (Watts et al. [2015], Heal and Park [2015]), damages to the capital stock (Stern [2013]) or through losses of production output (Nordhaus [2014], Stern [2007]). More generally, Pindyck [2013] and Stern [2013] argue that global warming will likely affect total factor productivity negatively and point out that it may slow down economic growth

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[1]A complete overview of climate change effects on human health and its intensity in different regions is given by Markandya and Chiabai [2009] and WHO [2014].

such that adverse economic impacts might compound over time. A recently emerging empirical literature studying temperature and economic outcomes in the last half century[2] has shown that countries experiencing increased temperatures, indeed, suffered not only from negative level effects on output but also from a reduction of economic growth. These effects predominantly affected below-average income countries. Such adverse impacts on the economy would necessarily reduce individual income, which in consequence affects life-cycle planning and the trade-off between spending on medical care, consumption and saving.

There is a large-body of literature studying the life-cycle allocation of health and consumption expenditures. The seminal work by Grossman [1972] introduced health investments into a life-cycle model, with Ehrlich and Chuma [1990] and Ehrlich [2000] extending the framework by endogenizing mortality. Kuhn et al. [2015] develop a life-cycle model featuring a realistic demography and mortality and expand the model to an overlapping generation (OLG) structure in Frankovic et al. [2016]. The life-cycle theory is well-established and tightly linked with a large body of empirical literature. Most relevant for our approach are studies stressing the link between longevity and savings as well as health investments through the value of life. For example, Bloom et al. [2003] and Bloom et al. [2007] show that increases in longevity lead to a rise in savings rates for all age-groups. Lorentzen et al. [2008], Oster [2012] and Oster et al. [2013] find a negative and causal relationship from mortality to investments into health as well as healthy behavior. Moreover, in a large body of literature, researches have attempted to estimate the value of a statistical life based on people's willingness to pay for small reductions in mortality or health risks, such as in Viscusi et al. [1991] or Cameron and Deshazo [2013]. The estimates are used in the assessment of policies to reduce health, environmental and safety risk. The value of life serves, thus, not only as a link between the life-cycle theory and empirically observed health behavior but also as a guidance for important policy decisions.

In this paper, we are aiming at understanding the impact of climate change on the demand for health care. While we are not fully calibrating our model to a specific country and offer no quantitative estimates on health expenditure effects, our main focus lies on identifying the main channels through which climate-induced health and income losses affect medical expenditures. To achieve that, we develop an overlapping generation (OLG) economy under the influence of climate change with a realistic demography and mortality as well as an endogenous demand of health care by extending the framework of Frankovic et al. [2016] with respect to climate change. The demand for health care is derived from utility maximization within a life-cycle model. Health care is provided by a medical sector, employing capital and labor, competing for resources with a final goods production sector. The population is affected by climate change through two channels. First, a degrading environmental quality increases mortality and reduces life-expectancy. In particular, our model allows for age-specific vulnerabilities to climate-induced health risks. Second, climate change negatively affects economic output, such that the income of individuals is reduced.

We will confine ourselves to the analysis of a small open economy, that is governed by an exogenous world market interest rate. Furthermore, we consider climate change to be exogenous and not amenable to the behavior of the economy at hand. This choice of framework conditions reflects the situation of a country that is sufficiently small to depend on foreign capital markets and to have only a negligible influence on world wide green house gas emissions.

Due to the high complexity of the model and the resulting difficulty in establishing a full ana-

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[2]See Dell et al. [2009] and Dell et al. [2012]; Dell et al. [2014] provide a review on further literature studying the economic effects of temperature increase.

lytical solution, we will primarily base our analysis on a numerical simulation. As a benchmark we determine the optimal allocation of health and consumption expenditures within a laissez-faire economy and an intact natural environment. We then analyze the isolated impact of climate change on health in a first experiment and consider age-specific vulnerability to climate-induced risks in a second scenario. The adverse impact on production is analyzed in a third experiment. Lastly, we evaluate how the effects in combination affect life-cycle decisions and aggregate health spending.

To our knowledge, we are the first to incorporate climate change into a life-cycle model with realistic mortality and endogenous health care demand. We are, thus, able to provide new insights into the age-specific response to climate change, its impacts on the life-cycle and aggregate health expenditures, some of which we summarize in the following. We find an ambiguous effect of climate change on health expenditures and the health share of GDP. While income and production suffer from climate change and affect health expenditures negatively, increased mortality risks induce individuals to invest more resources towards survival. Contrary to the existing literature on climate-induced health costs, health care demand might, thus, decrease in the presence of climate-induced mortality increases if income losses are sufficiently high. However, even in the absence of negative income effects, the value of life is reduced as a result of diminished life-expectancies, particularly for higher age-groups. Human health and longevity might, thus, not only be affected directly through increases in mortality but also through behavioral shifts toward less investments into protective and healthy goods, resulting in a complementarity of climate-induced health risks and unhealthy behavior. Among the elderly, health spending might even fall whose value of life is most strongly reduced due to such an adverse complementarity. Furthermore, age-specific vulnerabilities to climate-induced health threats do not only influence individual life-cycle planning, but significantly shape the effect on aggregate health care demand. For example, increases in aggregate health care demand are likely to be strongest when the young are predominantly affected by health risks and their population share is large. If the mortality of primarily higher age-groups is raised or the population is relatively old, smaller increases in health expenditures are to be expected. Hence, our results highlight the role of the life-cycle perspective in the impact of climate-change on future health care demand.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In the following section the model is introduced. Section 3 and 4 solve for and characterize the individual life-cycle allocation and the macroeconomic equilibrium of the economy. In section 5 a numerical solution to the model is presented before section 6 concludes.

2 The Model

We consider a decentralized OLG model, based on Frankovic et al. [2016], in which individuals choose consumption and health expenditure over their life-course. Climate change is fully taken into account but cannot be controlled by individuals. We index individuals by their age a at time t, with $t_0 = t - a$ denoting the birth year of an individual aged a at time t.

2.1 Mortality and Survival

At each age, individuals are subject to a mortality risk, where

$$S(a,t) = \exp\left[-\int_0^a \mu(s, h(s, t_0 + s), T(t_0 + s))ds\right]$$

4

is the survival function at (a, t), with $\mu(a, h(a, t), T(t))$ denoting the force of mortality. We follow Kuhn et al. [2015] by assuming that mortality can be lowered by consumption of a quantity $h(a, t)$ of health care. In this model it additionally depends on $T(t)$, describing the deviation of current temperature to the level that has prevailed before the onset of climate change.[3] More specifically and building on Kuhn et al. (2015), we assume that the mortality rate $\mu(a, h(a, t), T(t))$ satisfies

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mu(a, 0, 0) &= \tilde{\mu}(a, t), \ \mu_h(\cdot) < 0, \ \mu_{hh}(\cdot) > 0, \\
\mu_h(a, 0, T(t)) &= -\infty, \ \mu_h(a, \infty, T(t)) = 0 \quad \forall (a, t),
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\tilde{\mu}(a, t)$ is the "natural" mortality rate for an individual aged a at time t when no health care is consumed and the baseline temperature level $T(t) = 0$ prevails. By purchasing health care, an individual can lower the instantaneous mortality rate, and can thereby improve survival prospects, but can only do so with diminishing returns.

We assume the following properties with regard to the effect of $T(t)$ on mortality:

$$
\mu_T(\cdot) > 0, \ \mu_{TT}(\cdot) > 0, \ \mu_{hT}(\cdot) < 0 \ \forall (a, t). \tag{1}
$$

An increasing temperature deviation, thus, increases mortality and does so with increasing intensity. Furthermore, the effectiveness of health care increases as the climate conditions worsen. More specifically, we adapt the mortality function from Kuhn et al. [2015] and add dependency of $T(t)$ to capture the impact of climate change on the force of mortality assuming

$$
\mu(a, t) = f(a, T(t))\tilde{\mu}(a, t) \left[1 - \eta(a)h(a, t)^\epsilon\right], \tag{2}
$$

where $0 < \epsilon < 1$ reflects the decreasing returns of medical care on mortality. The term $\eta(a)$ represents the age-specific effectiveness of health care, which is assumed to fall over the life-course. We define the age-dependent environmental effect on mortality f as

$$
f(a, T) = 1 + v(a)T(t)^{\phi_f} \tag{3}
$$

with $\phi_f > 1$. The term $v(a) \geq 0$ reflects the vulnerability of the cohort aged a to climate changes. We can easily see that $f(a, 0) = 1$, implying that in the absence of health provision the base mortality is prevailing in the baseline environment. Furthermore it holds, that $f_T > 0$, $f_{TT} > 0$ if $T > 0$, which is in line with the assumptions made in (1).

Following the 2009 Lancet Report on Climate Change health impacts, see Costello et al. [2009], we assume that climate change is amplifying existing mortality risks rather than presenting a separate threat. The risk factor $f(a, T(t))$, thus, enters the mortality function multiplicatively. The dependency on a enables us to consider cohort-dependent impacts due to different vulnerability to environmental degradation across age-groups. This effect also holds in the absence of any health provision. Moreover, our model assumes that as the temperature increases, mortality rises and does so with increasing returns. This assumption is supported by the empirical results in Deschenes and Greenstone [2011] who find a non-linear relationship between daily temperatures and annual mortality based on heat-related health effects. While T does not present daily temperatures but a yearly mean temperature, there is broad consensus that increases in mean temperatures come along with

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[3]Let $\hat{T}(t)$ be the temperature at time t and T_0 be the mean temperature of the intact environment. $T(t)$ is then defined as $\hat{T}(t) - T_0$. Using this definition of temperature deviation, we follow the bulk of the climate change model literature.

increases in frequency and magnitude of heat extremes as well as daily maximum temperatures (see IPCC [2007], Seneviratne et al. [2014], Watts et al. [2015] and Jones et al. [2015]). Lastly, one can easily verify that the cross-derivative μ_{hT} is negative in our model setting, implying that health care is more effective at higher temperature levels. As the climate worsens, individuals are facing higher mortality rates which can be more effectively lowered as compared to an already low mortality level in an intact natural environment. Evidence for higher effectiveness (and, hence, higher utilization) of health care in the presence of adverse environmental conditions may be provided by the fact that hospitalization rates for respiratory diseases are positively associated with heat extremes in the US (see Anderson et al. [2013]) and in Europe (see Åström et al. [2013]).[4]

2.2 Individuals

The utility function of individuals born at $t_0 = t - a$ is given as:

$$\max_{c(\cdot),h(\cdot)} \int_0^\omega e^{-\rho a} u\left(c(a,t)\right) S(a,t) \ da. \tag{4}$$

The life-time utility is, thus, given by the discounted utility stream derived from consumption weighted by the individual's survival prospects. We assume that instantaneous utility u is given by

$$u(c(a,t)) = b + \frac{(c(a,t) - c_0)^{1-\sigma}}{1 - \sigma}. \tag{5}$$

In the spirit of Hall and Jones [2007], the parameter b is chosen such that instantaneous utility is always positive. Moreover, c_0 denotes a minimum consumption level. Individual survival S and capital k evolve according to the following differential equations:

$$\dot{S}(a,t) = -\mu(a, h(a,t), T(t)) S(a,t), \tag{6}$$

$$\dot{k}(a,t) = r(t) k(a,t) + l(a) w(t) - c(a,t) - \phi(t) p_H(t) h(a,t) - \tau(t) + s(t) \tag{7}$$

with $S(0, t - a) = 1$ and $k(0,t) = k(\omega, t) = 0$. The market interest rate r is given exogenously, whereas the wage w and the price for one unit of health care p_H are determined within the model. The parametric function $l(a)$ describes the effective labor supply and is given exogenously.[5,6] Individuals pay a share of $\phi(t)$ of their health expenditures out-of-pocket, while the remainder is covered by a public health insurance. The resulting tax, τ, is levied as a labor income tax by the government, such that total tax income equals total health care subsidies at each point in time. Due to our negligence of perfect annuity markets, accidental bequests accrue in the model, given by $\Upsilon_B(t)$, see (9) further below. In the model bequeathed capital is redistributed in a lump-sum fashion through $s(t)$, where

$$s(t) = \frac{\Upsilon_B(t)}{N(t)}. \tag{8}$$

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[4]It is also conceivable that climate change lowers health care effectiveness. Our analysis, hence, presents a lower-bound for otherwise even stronger negative effects on mortality.

[5]This model setting abstracts from a pension system such that individuals need to save for higher ages when their labor supply declines strongly. Note, that the fixed age-specific labor supply has similar effects on life-cycle decisions as a fixed retirement age because individuals are not able to adapt their labor supply according to, for example, changes in the life-expectancy.

[6]The model can be extended such that the individual survival chance $S(a,t)$, serving as a proxy for health, affects the effective labor supply ($l = l(a, S)$). In this case, individuals would also invest in health expenditures with a view of increasing their labor supply and, thus, income. Such a model setting yields qualitatively similar results to those presented in this paper, such that we retain the simpler model presented here. The solution to the richer model is available on request.

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2.3 Macroeconomic Aggregation

The number of births $B(t)$ at time t is exogenously given. Hence, the cohort aged a at time t has the size

$$N_c(a,t) = S(a,t)B(t-a).$$

Total population, $N(t)$, and deaths, $N_d(t)$, at time t are then given as

$$N(t) = \int_0^\omega N_c(a,t)\ da \qquad N_d(t) = \int_0^\omega \mu(a,t)N_c(a,t)\ da.$$

Furthermore, aggregate capital supply, $K(t)$, labor supply, $L(t)$, consumption, $C(t)$ and health care demand, $H(t)$ are given through aggregation of individual variables as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
K(t) &= \int_0^\omega k(a,t)N_c(a,t)\ da & L(t) &= \int_0^\omega l(a,t)N_c(a,t)\ da \\
C(t) &= \int_0^\omega c(a,t)N_c(a,t)\ da & H(t) &= \int_0^\omega h(a,t)N_c(a,t)\ da.
\end{aligned}
$$

The total amount of accidental bequests, $\Upsilon_B(t)$, distributed at time t is given as

$$\Upsilon_B(t) = \int_0^\omega k(a,t)\mu(a,t)N_c(a,t)\ da. \tag{9}$$

2.4 Firms

The supply side of the model consists of two sectors allowing us to trace structural shifts in the economy caused by climate change. The final goods production sector satisfy the demand for consumption and capital formation whereas the health care sector provides medical goods and services. Both sectors are perfectly competitive and profit functions are given as

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_Y(t) &= Y(\Lambda_Y(t), K_Y(t), L_Y(t)) - w(t)L_Y(t) - \delta K_Y(t) - r(t)K_Y(t), & (10) \\
V_H(t) &= p_H(t)F(\Lambda_H(t), K_H(t), L_H(t)) - w(t)L_H(t) - \delta K_H(t) - r(t)K_H(t) & (11)
\end{aligned}
$$

where Y and F are Cobb-Douglas production functions, that exhibit constant returns to scale. Hence, profits in each sector evaluates to zero. The variables $\Lambda_i(t)$, $K_i(t)$ and $L_i(t)$ describe the technological index, the demand for capital and labor employed in sector $i \in \{Y, H\}$, respectively. Capital depreciation is given by δ. The GDP is given as the sum of total production value in each sector:

$$GDP(t) = Y(t) + p_H(t)F(t).$$

2.5 Climate Change and Production

We assume that damages induced by the climate affect the production output in each sector and by doing so follow several studies arguing that climate change has and will likely have intensifying negative economic impacts.[7] More specifically, we adopt the well-known approach by Nordhaus [2014] and assume that

$$\Lambda_i(t) = \Lambda_0^i[1 - D(T(t))] \text{ where } i \in \{Y, H\}$$

where Λ_0^i denote the technology level in sector $i \in \{Y, H\}$ in the absence of climate change. Damages, D, are determined by the temperature level $T(t)$ and given by

$$D(T(t)) = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + dT^2}$$

where $d > 0$ reflect the scale of damages. The damage function can be viewed as a climate-induced reduction of total factor productivity (approach taken by Moyer et al. [2014]), but also as a reduction of production output (approach taken by Nordhaus [2014] and Stern [2007]). These two perspectives coincide, however, in the absence of economic growth. In fact, we will assume no exogenous growth in this model and focus on a steady-state analysis.

2.6 Market Clearing

The labor as well as the health care market clear within the small open economy. The capital and final good market are, however, considered open and use foreign alongside with domestic resources. The market clearing conditions are, thus, given as

$$
\begin{align}
L_Y(t) + L_H(t) &= L(t), \tag{12}\\
K_Y(t) + K_H(t) &= K(t) + K_F(t), \tag{13}\\
Y(\Lambda_Y(t), K_Y(t), L_Y(t)) + TX(t) &= C(t) + \dot{K}(t) + \delta K(t), \tag{14}\\
F(\Lambda_H(t), K_H(t), L_H(t)) &= H(t). \tag{15}
\end{align}
$$

Hence, aggregate labor supply $L(t)$ coincides with the sum of labor demand in each sector. Analogously the economy's total capital demand equals aggregate savings plus net capital flows from foreign countries $K_F(t)$. Net trade $TX(t)$ and the production in the final good sector covers aggregate consumption as well as economy-wide investments and capital replacement. Lastly, the total production in the health care sector equals the aggregate demand for medical care $H(t)$.

3 Optimal solution to the Individual Life-cycle Problem

Following the age-structured maximum principle, see Appendix A.1, we obtain the well-known Euler-equation, according to which consumption over the life-course is allocated in such a way, that the marginal substitution rate between consumption at two different times (a and $\hat{a}$, with marginal utility at the later age being appropriately discounted) equals the compound interest rate between these points in time:

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[7]See Heal and Park [2015], Moyer et al. [2014], Pindyck [2013], Nordhaus [2014] and Stern [2013] for a discussion of future climate change impacts and Dell et al. [2014] for an overview of historic and current effects of temperature increases on the economy.

$$\frac{u_c\left(c\left(a,t\right)\right)}{e^{-\rho(\widehat{a}-a)}u_c\left(c\left(\widehat{a},t+\widehat{a}-a\right)\right)} = \exp\left\{\int_a^{\widehat{a}}\left[r\left(t+\widehat{a}-a\right)-\mu\left(\widehat{a},t+\widehat{a}-a\right)\right]d\widehat{a}\right\}. \quad (16)$$

Note, that the interest rate that is relevant for the individual's life-cycle planning is the market interest rate minus the mortality rate. Hence, a higher mortality lowers the marginal utility of consumption at higher ages.

We define the value of life as the monetary value of an individual's status of being alive. Mathematically, this is captured by

$$\psi\left(a,t\right) := \frac{\lambda_S\left(a,t\right)}{u_c\left(a,t\right)}. \quad (17)$$

The shadow price of survival measures the utility an individual is expected to derive over its remaining lifetime. This becomes evident when solving for λ_S (see Appendix A.1) where we obtain

$$\lambda_S\left(a,t\right) = \int_a^{\omega} u\left(\widehat{a},t+\widehat{a}-a\right)\exp\left[-\int_a^{\widehat{a}}\left(\rho+\mu\right)d\widehat{\widehat{a}}\right]d\widehat{a}.$$

By dividing the shadow price of survival by $u_c(a,t)$, the value is converted into units of consumption or, in other words, into monetary units. Using this definition of the value of life, we can transform it to (Appendix A.1)

$$\psi\left(a,t\right) = \int_a^{\omega}\frac{u\left(\widehat{a},t+\widehat{a}-a\right)}{u_c\left(\cdot\right)}R\left(\widehat{a},a\right)d\widehat{a}, \quad (18)$$

where

$$R\left(\widehat{a},a\right) := \exp\left[-\int_a^{\widehat{a}}r\left(t+\widehat{\widehat{a}}-a\right)d\widehat{\widehat{a}}\right]. \quad (19)$$

Furthermore, optimal individual health care demand is given by the following equation:

$$-\mu_h\left(a,t\right)\psi(a,t) = \phi\left(t\right)p_H\left(t\right). \quad (20)$$

Health care demand is, thus, allocated in such a way that the consumer price of one unit of health care, $\phi(t)p_H(t)$, equals the monetary value of the marginal reduction in the mortality caused by this health investment. The latter is given by the product of the marginal effect of one unit of health care on the mortality, μ_h, and the value of life, ψ.

The demand for health care over the life-course

Based on the first-order condition for health (equation (20)) and on the actual functional form of the mortality function, given by equation (2), we can, through simple rearranging, derive the demand for health care as

$$h(a,t) = \left(\frac{\Psi(a,t)f(a,T)\tilde{\mu}(a)\eta(a)\epsilon}{\phi(t)p_H(t)}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}. \quad (21)$$

Hence, health care demand over the life-cycle rises with the value of life $\Psi(a,t)$, the climate-induced mortality risk factor $f(a,T)$, the base mortality $\tilde{\mu}(a)$ and the effectiveness of health care investments $\eta(a)$. By contrast, health care demand falls with the consumer price for health care $\phi(t)p_H(t)$.

Here, the main difference of this paper and existing studies on climate-induced health cost predictions becomes evident. While the latter derive health care demand as the product of a measure of mortality or morbidity and the unit price of medical care, this approach takes into account the age-specific effectiveness on mortality reductions by health care as well as the willingness to pay for survival as measured by the value of life. We are, thus, able to take account of interactions of health care demand with mortality increases and income effects. For example, an individual might prefer to increase health care demand to a lesser extent than mortality has increased, if the mortality increase reduces survival chances and, thus, the utility attached to higher ages. Negative income effects are also likely to dampen the increase in health care demand as resulting losses in consumption negatively affect the value of life.

The evolution of consumption and health expenditures over the life-course

The dynamics of consumption (see Appendix A.2) is described by

$$\dot{c} = \frac{u_c}{u_{cc}} \left[\rho - r + \mu \right]. \tag{22}$$

Consumption rises as long as the interest rate exceeds the time preference if mortality is sufficiently small. As mortality rises with age, consumption will eventually begin to decline and, thus, generate a hump-shaped profile over the life-course. Note, that the temperature $T(t)$ does not affect the growth of consumption over lifetime, but only the level of $c(t)$ through life-budget effects.

The evolution of health care demand is given by

$$\dot{h} = \frac{-1}{\underbrace{\mu_{hh}}_{<0}} \left[\mu_{ha} + \mu_{hT} \dot{T} + \underbrace{\mu_h}_{<0} \left(\frac{\dot{\psi}}{\psi} - \frac{\dot{p}_H}{p_H} - \frac{\dot{\phi}}{\phi} \right) \right]. \tag{23}$$

Hence, if the marginal effectiveness of health care increases with age $\mu_{ha} < 0$ or temperature $\mu_{hT} < 0$, health care demand rises with age or the temperature, respectively. Similarly, a rising value of life, a falling price for health care or co-pay rate, results in rising health care demand.

4   Macroeconomic Equilibrium

Perfectly competitive firms in the production sector choose labor $L_Y(t)$ and capital $K_Y(t)$ so as to maximize period profit (10). The first-order conditions imply

$$r(t) = Y_{K_Y}(t) - \delta \tag{24}$$
$$w(t) = Y_{L_Y}(t), \tag{25}$$

i.e. the market interest rate is equal to the marginal product of capital net of depreciation; and the wage rate is equal to the marginal product of labor. Assuming a neo-classical technology with constant returns to scale we then obtain

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_Y(t) &= Y(\Lambda_Y(t), K_Y^*(t), L_Y^*(t)) - w(t) L_Y^*(t) - [\delta + r(t)] K_Y^*(t) \\
&= (Y(\Lambda_Y(t), K_Y^*(t), L_Y^*(t)) - Y_{L_Y}(\cdot) L_Y^*(t) - Y_{K_Y}(\cdot) K_Y^*(t)) = 0,
\end{aligned}
$$

i.e. firms in the production sector make no profit.

10

Perfectly competitive providers of health care choose the labor $L_H(t)$ and capital $K_H(t)$ so as to maximise period profit (11). From the first-order condition we obtain

$$r(t) \;=\; p_H(t)F_{K_H}(t) - \delta \tag{26}$$
$$w(t) \;=\; p_H(t)F_{L_H}(t), \tag{27}$$

Analogously to the production sector, profits equal zero in the health care sector if a neo-classical technology with constant returns to scale is assumed. Combining (26) and (27) with (24) and (25) we have

$$p_H(t) = \frac{Y_{L_Y}(t)}{F_{L_H}(t)} = \frac{Y_{K_Y}(t)}{F_{K_H}(t)}, \tag{28}$$

implying that capital and labor inputs are distributed across the production and health care sector in a way that equalizes the price for health care with the marginal rate of transformation between outputs in each sector. For example, $\frac{Y_{L_Y}(t)}{F_{L_H}(t)}$ measures the relative output gain in production as compared to the output loss in health care from reallocating one labor unit from health care into production. The higher the price for health care, the lower will be F_{L_H} implying that more workers will be allocated to the health care sector. Analogously, a rising price for health care implies a shift of capital used in production to the health care sector. Assuming appropriate Inada conditions, $Y_L(\Lambda_Y, K_Y, 0) = Y_K = (\Lambda_Y, 0, L_Y) = \infty$ and $F_L(\Lambda_H, K_H, 0) = F_K(\Lambda_H, 0, L_H) = \infty$ we always have an interior allocation with $L_H(t) = L(t) - L_Y(t) \in (0, L(t))$ and $K_H(t) = K(t) - K_Y(t) \in (0, K(t))$. In the numerical simulation of our model we will use Cobb-Douglas specifications for the production functions. In Appendix A.3, we show that the set of prices and market allocations $\{w(t), p_H(t), L_Y(t), K_Y(t)\}$ as well as input and output quantities can be expressed in terms of the interest rate $r(t)$ and temperature deviation $T(t)$. This insight will be used in the numerical solution of the model.

5 Numerical Solution

In this section, we present the outcomes of the following numerical experiments. The benchmark scenario features a stylized, small economy that is unaffected by climate change. We then introduce a climate-induced mortality effect that uniformly affects all age-groups in a first experiment (i). Second, we investigate the effects of a varying vulnerability across age-groups (ii). As a third scenario we consider the detrimental effect of climate change on the economy's production (iii). We then continue by modeling a simultaneous mortality and production effect as climate change will likely encompass both impacts (iv). In order to solve the numerical problem we employ the algorithm presented in Frankovic et al. [2016]. Due to our exogenous market interest rate, the algorithm used in this paper is, however, simplified to the partial equilibrium approach.

Note, that we are considering climate change and the market interest rate exogenous factors in this simulation. We motivate the former and latter by our choice of a small open economy as the subject of our experiments. Such an economy is unlikely able to influence the worldwide temperature development on its own, such as through a reduction in production emissions, nor can it be considered a closed economy but instead depends on an exogenous world market interest rate. Moreover, as climate change is a long-term development, we are interested in its long-term effects and simulate the steady state obtained in the various experimental parameter and model settings. However, in experiment (i) we will additionally consider the immediate impact of an environmental shock that is unanticipated by the individuals and study how the economy dynamically reacts to

such new circumstances. Finally, we abstract from economic growth as we are interested in the isolated impacts of climate change on health and the economy.[8]

While our model is not calibrated to a specific country in detail, we nonetheless use empirical data from Taiwan to obtain realistic life-cycle profiles with respect to mortality and labor supply in the numerical simulation of the benchmark scenario. We chose Taiwan because it exhibits a high climate vulnerability and is considered to have relatively strong climate-induced effects on human health, see Su et al. [2016]. Furthermore, we roughly match some key macroeconomic variables of Taiwan in the benchmark scenario. This notwithstanding, our main focus lies in identifying the transmission channels of health and economic impacts of climate change rather than offering a quantitative analysis of Taiwan's climate change vulnerability.

5.1 Specification of the Numerical Analysis

The main components of our benchmark numerical model are specified as follows.

Demography

The single-year model consists of individuals who enter the model economy at age 20 and can live up to the maximum age 100. In our model, a birth at age 20 implies that $\omega = 80$. The number of births is given as $B(t) = B_0 \exp[\nu t]$ where $\nu = 1.0\%$ and $B_0 = 0.1$. Population growth is, thus, determined through the exogenous number of births but also by endogenous mortality.

Mortality

The force of mortality μ is endogenously determined in the model as given in equation (2). In order to obtain a realistic base mortality profile, we chose the mortality rates[9] of Taiwan in 1970 as the base mortality rate. Furthermore, we define the decreasing effectiveness of health care with age as

$$\eta(a) = \left(\frac{a - \omega}{1 - \omega} \right)^{1/4}$$

This parametric setting was chosen, such that optimal investments in health $h(t)$ lower base mortality to an extent that the endogenously determined life-expectancy matches present-day data of Taiwan.

Labor supply

To obtain a realistic labor supply profile over the life-course, we proxy $l(a)$ from equation (7) by an age-specific income schedule (see Figure 1), constructed from 2015 earnings data, as provided by the National Statistic Bureau in Taiwan. We then normalize the income schedule and calibrate the market wage rate $w(t)$ so it matches the maximal life-course income obtained at age 50. We do not model explicitly the pay-as-you-go retirement system of Taiwan due to its rather small replacement rate and, thus, its minor contribution to life-cycle considerations (see Bloom et al. [2007]).

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[8]Hutton [2011] notes, that studies on climate-induced health expenditures usually avoid considering ongoing economic development as the related estimates about the future are often highly uncertain.

[9]We use single-year age-specific mortality data from the Human Mortality Database (HMD).

Figure 1: Age-specific labor supply

Health Insurance

We set $\phi(t) = 0.35 \ \forall t$ such that 35% of all health expenditures are payed out-of-pocket, whereas the remaining share is payed for by the public health insurance. The medical care subsidies are financed by an income tax and the government's budget is balanced at all times. The value of 35% reflects the out-of-pocket share in the national health insurance plan by the Taiwanese government.[10]

Remaining parameters and functional forms

Parameter	Description	Value
r	market interest rate	4%
σ	inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution	1.75
b	constant offset for consumption in utility function	5
ρ	time preference ρ	2%
c_0	subsistence minimum	0.8
ϵ	effectiveness of medical care in μ	0.1
δ	rate of depreciation	5%
α	elasticity of capital in Y	1/3
β	elasticity of capital in F	1/5
Λ_0^Y	base productivity in production sector	1.6
Λ_0^H	base productivity in medical sector	0.3
d	scale of climate-induced output damages	0

Table 1: Parameters

Table 1 and 2 show the numerical inputs for the remaining parameters and functional forms of the benchmark model which are mostly based on the values chosen in Frankovic et al. [2016] and reflect in general standard values in the life-cycle literature. Note, that the elasticity of capital in the production sector, α, is higher than in the medical sector, β, implying the assumption that the

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[10]Data on national health expenditures were taken from the Taiwan Ministry of Health and Welfare, accessible at `http://www.mohw.gov.tw/EN/Ministry/Statistic.aspx?f_list_no=474`.

health care sector is less capital-intensive than the remaining economy.[11] Our values of Λ_0^Y and Λ_0^H were chosen to obtain a realistic GDP per capita as well as health share of the economy.

Function	Description
$T(t) \equiv 0$	temperature deviation from baseline climate
$v(a) \equiv 0$	vulnerability to climate-induced health risks
$Y(t) = \Lambda_Y(t)K_Y(t)^\alpha L_Y(t)^{(1-\alpha)}$	production in manufacturing sector
$F(t) = \Lambda_H(t)K_H(t)^\beta L_H(t)^{(1-\beta)}$	production in medical sector
$\eta(a) = \left(\frac{a-\omega}{1-\omega}\right)^{1/4}$	health care effectiveness
$B(t) = B_0 \exp[\nu t]$	Number of births

Table 2: Functional forms

Note, that the parameter setting differs in the experiments compared to the Benchmark scenario. Temperature deviation $T(t)$ will be modified in each of the experiments, such that the impact of climate change can be studied. Depending on whether we are interested in mortality or production effects, we will further modify $v(a)$ and d that measure the scale of climate-induced effects on mortality and production, respectively.

5.2 Benchmark

The blue (solid line) plots in Figure 2 show the benchmark life-cycle profiles of various individual variables. Consumption expenditures exhibit a hump-shaped pattern, reflecting the initial increase in consumption due to rising income and the eventual decline due to the uncertainty in survival to high ages. Savings are accumulated during the working life in anticipation of low old-age labor supply and high old-age health care spending. Capital begins to decline once the individuals enters retirement and falls to zero at the maximum age. In fact, empirical life-cycle profiles exhibit consumption expenditures that are rising until the middle-ages and falling later in life (see Tung [2011] for an international comparison of consumption age-profiles, including Taiwan). Health care expenditures initially rise slowly reflecting the low base mortality at younger ages. From age 50 onwards they increase strongly due to increasing mortality, after which, around age 80, they begin to fall due to a strongly declining value of life. This hump-shaped pattern is reflected by equation (23). In the absence of changes in temperature, in the price for health care and in the co-pay rate ($\dot{T} = \dot{p_H} = \dot{\phi} = 0$), the evolution of health care demand over the life-course is shaped by two-factors. First, the effect of age on the marginal effectiveness of medical care μ_{ha} reflects the initially increasing health care demand over the life-course and is driven by the increasing base mortality. By contrast, the decreasing value of life ($\dot{\Psi} < 0$) works to decrease demand for medical care at the highest ages. This health expenditure profile is qualitatively in line with data on medical expenses over the life-course that in general exhibit decreasing health expenditures in the highest age-groups.[12]

As we abstract from economic growth, the macroeconomic variables of the economy are in a steady-state. In particular, the per-capita health expenditures and the GDP share of health expenditures are constant throughout the whole time horizon. Table 3 offers information on selected steady-state

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[11]This assumption is motivated in Frankovic et al. [2016].

[12]See Frankovic et al. [2016] for a discussion of US data and European Commission [2015] for an overview of the European member countries. We are not aware of a data source providing age-specific health expenditures for Taiwan.

variables of the benchmark economy.[13]

Variable	Benchmark value
Remaining life expectancy at age 20	60.8 years
Remaining life expectancy at age 65	19.5 years
Share of elderly (65+)	21.5%
Health share of GDP	7.2%
Employment share in production sector	91%
Payroll tax for health care system	8.5%

Table 3: Macroeconomic variables

5.3 Climate-induced Mortality Risks

In this section we consider two experiments. In experiment (i) we study the impact of a uniform increase in mortality risk regardless of age, while we consider the effect of age-specific vulnerabilities to climate change in experiment (ii).

5.3.1 Uniform increase in mortality risk

In experiment (i), climate change affects mortality for all age-groups with the same multiplicative factor while we neglect any climate-induced impacts on production. This serves the purpose of understanding the pure impact of increased mortality risk on individuals by disentangling them from income-induced effects. However, this simulation can also be interpreted as a more optimistic scenario, in which economic output and, thus, income is not or only to a negligible degree lowered by climate change.

Compared to the numerical specification in section 5.1 representing the benchmark scenario, we modify the parameter setting in two regards. First, we assume an increase in temperature at all times by three degrees (by setting $T(t) \equiv 3$). Second, we define health vulnerability uniformly as $v(a) \equiv 0.077$ for all age-groups. This model setting, thus, describes a world featuring a higher temperature level that affects individual's mortality with the same intensity regardless of age. The parameter ϕ_f, denoting the mortality responsiveness to temperature, is set to 1.5 reflecting the non-linear relationship between daily temperatures and mortality rates as found in Deschenes and Greenstone [2011].[14]

Figure 2 shows the individual lifetime variables for the benchmark case (blue, solid line) and the climate-induced high mortality case (green, dashed line). In experiment (i), the increased mortality at all ages results in a lower survival chance at every age. Consequently, life expectancy at age 20 drops by 3.3 years,[15] which has multiple effects on the individual life-cycle. First, we observe, that consumption starts out at an approximately equal level compared to the baseline but lies below

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[13]Note, that our economy only considers individuals aged 20 or older, such that the share of elderly (65+) measures the number of people aged 65 or older divided by the number of those aged 20 or older.

[14]We assume an increase in mean temperatures by about three degrees which reflects a rather high-emission scenario. The impact on mortality rates caused by such an increase in mean temperatures encompassing all direct and indirect climate-induced effects described in the introduction cannot be known precisely, such that an exact calibration is impossible to conduct. Our choice of the parameters $v(a)$ and ϕ_f is, however, motivated by obtaining increases in the mortality rate large enough to have an impact on life-cycle savings as well as on health expenditures.

[15]The decrease in life-expectancy by 3.3 years is not to be understood as a prediction but serves to illustrate the economic consequences of such a rather strong impact on longevity.

Figure 2: Life-course consumption, health expenditures, capital and value of life profiles for benchmark case (blue, solid line), and the climate-induced hight mortality scenario (green, dashed line)

it for higher ages. Moreover, the peak of consumption in the life-cycle occurs a few years earlier. This is due to diminished survival chances and, hence, a lower weighting of utility at high ages. Second, health expenditures rise above the benchmark level until about age 70, a direct response to the higher base mortality rate. Somewhat surprisingly, however, medical expenses are lower for the highest age-groups as compared to the baseline, which we will discuss further below. Third, individual assets are reduced for all age-groups as a consequence of a lower incentive for old-age saving. Fourth, the value of life, that is determined by the consumption levels over the remaining life-course, is lower compared to the baseline throughout the whole life-cycle as a result of lower consumption at higher ages.

We now want to shed light on the question why health expenditures respond differently at varying ages relative to the baseline. Inspecting equation (21), we note that

$$\left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}(a)\eta(a)\epsilon(a)}{\phi(t)p_H(t)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

is identical in the benchmark scenario and experiment (i). The differences in health care demand solely result from changes in $\Psi(a,t)f(a,T)$.[16] Thus, we observe two competing impacts on health

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[16]The price for health care, p_H, is determined by the fixed interest rate r as well as by Λ_H and Λ_Y, see Appendix A.3. Due to our negligence of production impacts in this experiment, the price of health care does in consequence not change in experiment (i) compared to the benchmark.

care demand in experiment (i) relative to the baseline. While, the decreased value of life exerts downward pressure, the increased mortality risk induces an upward force on health care demand. This is illustrated in Figure 3a, which shows the health care demand in different scenarios relative to the health care demand in the baseline. Naturally, the blue, solid baseline plot is simply constant and of value one. The cyan, dashed-dotted line reflects the relative increase of health care demand for younger cohorts and reduction for the elderly in experiment (i), as already seen in Figure 2. The remaining two plots show two counter-factuals, that serve the purpose of decomposing and illustrating the isolated effects of the value of life (VOL) and climate-induced mortality risk, respectively. Evaluating equation (21) using the VOL from the benchmark case and f from experiment (i) (depicted by the red, dotted plot) we observe, that the induced mortality risk increases health care demand uniformly for all age-groups if the VOL channel is shut down. Conversely, ignoring this additional mortality risk and (counter-factually) considering only the effect on the VOL leads to a decrease in health care demand that intensifies with age, shown by the green, dashed plot. The differential effect on health care expenditures for different age-groups is, thus, explained by the fact, that at lower ages the increased mortality risks dominate, whereas at higher ages, the diminished value of life overcompensates the additional mortality risk induced by climate change.

(a) Benchmark (blue, solid)
High mortality case (cyan, dashed-dotted)
Benchmark VOL (red, dotted)
Benchmark f (green, dashed)

(b) Benchmark (blue, solid)
High mortality case (cyan, dashed-dotted)
Benchmark h (red, dotted)
Benchmark f (green, dashed)

Figure 3: Decomposition of life-cycle health care demand and mortality

In a similar fashion one can decompose the effect on age-specific mortality attributable to a) the climate-induced health risk and b) shifted age-specific medical care spending, which we illustrate in Figure 3b. Again we are considering the effect on mortality relative to the benchmark case. Keeping health care demand unchanged with respect to the benchmark case, the climate-induced health risk increases mortality uniformly (see red, dotted plot). If we consider, however, the altered health care demand while shutting down the effect of f, we can observe, that younger individuals lower their mortality rate while the elderly allow for a even higher mortality risk (illustrated by green, dashed plot). Hence, in total, the increased health care spending among lower age-groups dampens the climate-induced mortality increase, while at higher ages, the reduced health care spending amplifies the mortality risk, as illustrated by the cyan, dashed-dotted plot for experiment (i). Indeed, longevity losses induced by climate change are greatest among older cohorts,[17] contributing to the stronger relative effect for the elderly on the value of life. Hence, in addition to the direct effect of climate change on mortality, the reduced value attached to lives might further deteriorate health,

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[17]The remaining life expectancy of a 20-year-old falls by 5% compared to 13% for an individual aged 65.

particularly among vulnerable groups such as the elderly. This represents an adverse complementarity between health risks caused by climate change and behavioral shifts towards lower health investments and stands in contrast to the favorable complementarity described by Dow et al. [1999] and Murphy and Topel [2006] in which cause-specific mortality reductions increase the incentives to invest in health care affecting mortality from other causes.

Notably, this result is consistent with empirical evidence linking health behavior to remaining life expectancy and the value of life. For example, Oster [2012] finds that health behavior response to HIV is stronger among individuals who have a higher life-expectancy. In another study, Oster et al. [2013] show that individuals diagnosed with Huntington's disease, that considerably lowers life expectancy, have riskier health behavior and smaller investments in health compared to those individuals that have been diagnosed negatively. While the first study was implemented in developing countries, the second study shows that the link between health behavior and remaining life expectancy also holds in richer countries, indicating that this relationship is universal to life-cycle planning.

As already mentioned, savings are reduced in the considered experiment. This is due to the diminished life-expectancy and the resulting smaller incentive for old-age savings, a mechanism in line with theoretical and empirical findings established by Bloom et al. [2003] and in particular with Lee et al. [2000] who examined the relationship between life expectancy and savings in Taiwan. However, one would expect that the higher health expenditures might in fact also induce the opposite, hence a positive effect on savings, as individuals need to accumulate financial cushions in order to provide for higher health expenditures (see De Nardi et al. [2010]). However, this is not the case in our setting due to the fact that the bulk of the additional health expenditures accrue while individuals are still working. At very old ages, health expenditures are actually reduced as already noted and this, in fact, works to diminish savings additionally.

In Table 4, we report the macroeconomic effects of experiment (i). Health expenditures per capita in our model economy rise as the increase of health care demand among the young dominates the decrease within the group of the elderly. As a consequence individuals decrease consumption expenditures on average in order to cover the higher health expenditures. This economic-wide shift of consumption towards health care is also reflected by an increased health share of GDP and the employment share in the health sector.

Variable	Change rel. to benchmark
Life expectancy	−3.3 years
Health care expenditures per capita	+7.3%
Consumption expenditures per capita	−1.1%
Health share of GDP	+0.4 pp
Employment share in health care sector	+0.5 pp

Table 4: Macroeconomic variables

So far, we have looked at the long-term impact of climate-induced health risks (while neglecting production effects) and observed a reallocation from consumption to health, with the exception of the most elderly individuals who tend to decrease health care demand in the face of high mortality risk. While this is an interesting insight into the longterm life-cycle effects of increased mortality, an important question is how individuals react to climate-induced effects on health if these arrive

as a shock. To answer this question, we now alter the parameter setting of experiment (i) such that there is an unanticipated temperature, and hence, mortality increase at $t = 200$, i.e.

$$
\begin{aligned}
T(t) &= 0 \quad \forall t \in [0, 200] \\
&= 3 \quad \forall t > 200.
\end{aligned}
$$

Figure 4 illustrates the impact of climate change on individuals aged 80 at the time of shock.[18] Contrary to the long-run steady-state, the elderly increase their health spending as an immediate response to an unanticipated negative shock to mortality. An analogous decomposition method as above (not shown here) reveals that again increased mortality risk tend to increase health care demand and a diminished value of life lowers it. However, the reduction in the value of life is dampened as individuals shift consumption that was originally planned for the late stages of their life towards the closer future.


Figure 4: Individual health expenditures (left) and health expenditures per capita (right) in the benchmark scenario (blue, solid line), steady-state effect of experiment (i) (green, dashed line) and shock effect of experiment (i) (red, dotted line)

This initial, strong increase in health investments is observed among all age-groups, such that average health expenditures rise strongly above the long-term value at the time of the shock at $t = 200$, as shown in the right panel of Figure 4. This is consistent with several studies (Semenza et al. [1999] and Michelozzi et al. [2009]) finding evidence that heat waves, that usually pose an unanticipated threat to health and even life, increase the short-term demand for health care significantly. In the long-run, however, and if climate change permanently increases mortality, this analysis implies that the impact on health expenditures could vary by age. In particular, less medical care could be demanded by the elderly who shift health expenditures to earlier stages of their life.

5.3.2 Age-specific increase in mortality risk

We now consider experiment (ii) in which climate change affects different age-groups to a varying degree and focus only on the steady-state outcomes. In subexperiment (iia), we assume, that vulnerability $v(a)$ grows linearly with age, where $v(a) = \left(\frac{a}{\omega}\right) v_{\max}$. We choose parameter $v_{\max}$ in such a way that life expectancy at age 20 is reduced to the same extent as in experiment (i), namely by 3.3 years.[19] Figure 5 shows survival over lifetime for experiment (i) (uniform increase in mortality)

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[18]Note, that we implement the shock in our numerical simulation by restricting individuals to differ from their benchmark life-cycle allocation until the shock arrives.

[19]Setting $v_{\max} = 0.137$ reduces life-expectancy by that extent.

Figure 5: Survival and the value of life relative to the benchmark case in experiment (i, age-independent mortality effect, green-dashed line) and experiment (iia, increasing vulnerability with age, red-dotted line)

and experiment (iia) relative to the benchmark case.[20] Survival is below the benchmark level at any age in both experiments, however, for the age-independent increase of climate change risk on mortality (green, dashed plot) survival falls faster until age 70 and slower afterwards compared to experiment (iib) where vulnerability to climate-induced health effects are taken into account (red, dotted plot).[21] Hence, the age-specific vulnerabilities result in a differential effect on survival prospects of different age groups. A similar picture emerges for the value of life (VOL), see right panel of Figure 5. While younger individuals posses a higher willingness to pay for survival relative to experiment (i), the VOL of the elderly is even further reduced. This observation is in line with the health expenditures of the elderly in experiment (iia), shown in Figure 6, that drop even below the level of experiment (i) despite the increase in climate-induced health vulnerability they face. Apparently, the further increase of mortality in these age-groups is outweighed by the even larger reduction in the VOL. Younger individuals, however increase health expenditures to a lesser extent relative to the benchmark scenario as compared to experiment (i) due to their lower vulnerability to climate-induced mortality risks.


Figure 6: Health expenditures for benchmark case (blue, solid line), the climate-induced high mortality scenario (green, dashed line) and age-increasing vulnerability scenario (red, dotted line)

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[20]Throughout the paper we restrict the plots showing variables relative to the benchmark case until age 90. This is due to the fact that relative differences rise strongly with age due to the fact that survival falls exponentially with mortality rates. Hence, the large relative differences at high ages would make the changes at the more relevant, younger ages less apparent in the graphs.

[21]This is also reflected by the remaining life expectancy at age 70, which is 4% lower in experiment (ii) compared to (i).

In Figure 7, we show the effect of the increased mortality risk on further individual life-cycle variables. The decreased life-expectancy results, analogous to experiment (i), in an overall reduction and front-loading of consumption expenditures. However, individuals can sustain higher consumption for a longer time during their life compared to experiment (i) as they face lower health expenditures at younger ages. At very high ages, consumption falls below the level of experiment (i) as individuals discount old-age consumption to an even greater extent. The negative savings incentive due to the diminished longevity appears to be stronger in experiment (iia). In particular, the onset of dissaving within the life-cycle happens at a younger age. While the overall reduction of life expectancy is identical in experiment (i) and (iia), the survival changes of younger (older) individuals are greater (smaller) in the former experiment. As savings are mainly accumulated for the provision of financial resources at high ages when labor income is low, the old-age saving incentive is, thus, weaker in experiment (iia).


Figure 7: Life-course consumption, health expenditures and capital profiles for benchmark case (blue, solid line), the climate-induced high mortality scenario (green, dashed line) and age-increasing vulnerability scenario (red, dotted line)

In a further variation of experiment (ii), we now reverse age-specific vulnerabilities, such that the young bear the largest adverse impacts of climate-induced health effects.[22] In Figure 8, we plot survival relative to the benchmark scenario. Compared to the case, where vulnerability is increasing with age, the opposite picture emerges. The young face diminished survival prospects relative to experiment (iia), while the elderly are less severely hit by climate change. While this differential effect on survival might seem obvious considering the assumed vulnerability-age link, it has important implications for the aggregate health care demand and the economy. To see this point, we report a selection of macroeconomic variables in Table 5. Despite the identical impact on overall life expectancy, health expenditures per capita react to strongly varying degrees across the experiments. In the case of an age-independent effect on mortality (experiment (i)), health expenditures per capita rise by 7 % relative to the benchmark scenario. In experiment (iia), where vulnerability increases with age, they rise by only 4% while in experiment (iib), featuring decreasing age-specific vulnerability, they exhibit a much stronger increase by 12 %. As we have seen in the previous experiments, the younger age-groups tend to increase health-spending in the light of mortality increases whereas higher age-groups tend to decrease medical expenditures in the long-run. Thus, climate-induced health affecting predominantly the young will increase health-spending to a greater extent than in the scenario where the elderly are most harmed.[23] This pattern

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[22]Vulnerability $v(a)$ now falls linearly with age, with $v(a) = \left(1 - \frac{a}{\omega}\right) v_{\max}$. We set $v_{\max} = 0.19$ as this parameter value results in the identical loss of overall life expectancy of 3.3 years.

[23]The demographic structure also influences the increase in health expenditures across the experiments. Given

Figure 8: Survival relative to the benchmark case as shown in Figure 5 including experiment (iib, decreasing vulnerability with age) shown by the cyan dashed-dotted line

Variable	cons. Vuln. (i)	increasing Vuln. (iia)	decreasing Vuln. (iib)
Life expectancy	-3.3 years	-3.3 years	-3.3 years
Health care exp. p. cap	+7%	+4%	+12%
Health share of GDP	+0.4 pp	+0.1 pp	+0.7 pp
Health income tax	+0.4 pp	+0.2 pp	+0.9 pp
Consumption exp. p. cap.	-1.1%	-0.5%	-2.1%
Savings per capita	-13.8%	-14.6%	-12.9%

Table 5: Macroeconomic variables

is also dominant when considering the econonmy's health share and income tax. Consumption, as expected, behaves inversely to health expenditures, as consumption is reduced most in the scenarios where health expenditures rise to the largest extent. Interestingly, the aggregate effect on average savings in the population shows a distinctly different behavior across the experiments. While savings, as already discussed, decrease as a result of a lower saving-incentive, the effect is weakest in (iib). This is due to the fact, that individuals who survive into ages with low labor supply experience a greater remaining life expectancy as those in experiment (i) and (iia). Hence, the old-age saving incentive is stronger in this scenario, resulting in a lower decrease in savings.

5.4   Climate-induced Losses to Production

We will now consider scenario (iii) in which losses to production are caused through climate change as described in section 2.5. To do so, we set $T(t) = 3$ for all times analogous to experiments (i) and (ii). However, we neglect any effect on mortality ($f(a,T) = 1$) and focus solely on production effects. By setting $d = 0.0024$, we model a reduction of approximately 3% in GDP relative to the benchmark scenario.[24] Again, we are only focusing on the long-term impacts on life-cycle allocations and macroeconomic outcomes of a climate-induced output damages.

that our model features a population with a rather large share of elderly, the gap between experiments (iib) and (iia) might even be larger in the case of a younger population.

[24]Our choice of d is close to the value assumed in Nordhaus [2014]. However, as Pindyck [2013] points out, d is a rather speculative parameter as scientists are not able to quantify the impact of unprecedented temperature levels on economic output based on empirical estimates.

Figure 9 shows the impact on life-cycle allocations. As income has been reduced (see Table 6), individuals reduce consumption and savings over the life-course. While these reductions appear to be strongest within the middle-aged groups in absolute terms, they are fairly constant over the life-cycle relative to their age-specific levels. As a result of diminished investments into health, life expectancy drops below the baseline by about 0.2 years. Due to the diminished consumption, the effect on the value of life is negative for all ages.


Figure 9: Life-course consumption, health expenditures, capital and value of life profiles for benchmark case (blue, solid line), and the production losses scenario (green, dashed line)

The macroeconomics shifts relative to the benchmark scenario are shown in Table 6. As expected, wage falls as a response to diminished output. In consequence, the price of health care is reduced due to the fact, that the medical sector is relatively more labor intensive compared to the final good sector. This effect is very weak as seen in Table 6 and would, in fact, work towards an expansion of health care demand. Consequently, the negative effect on health care demand, that we observe in Figure 9, is caused predominantly by diminished incomes and only slightly dampened by the simultaneous decrease in the price for medical care.

Considering the life-cycle effects, it comes as no surprise that consumption, health care expenditures and capital per capita fall below the benchmark level. Interestingly however, the share of GDP of the health care sector is reduced as well, indicating that the reduction in health care spending has been stronger in relative terms compared to the decline in consumption expenditures. While the economy shrinks we can, thus, observe a structural change towards the production sector. This is in line with Hall and Jones [2007], who have shown, that using standard economic assumptions, rising incomes generate a rising health expenditure share as the marginal utility of consumption falls rapidly whereas the marginal utility of life extension, by means of health expenditures, does not decline. Conversely, falling incomes must lead to a reduced share of health expenditures.

5.5 Climate-induced Combined Effect on Mortality and Production

It is rather unlikely that countries will be affected by climate change through one single channel such as losses in income or increases in health risks, but rather will be subject to both effects. Thus, we now consider experiment (iv), which represents the combined impact of experiments (i)

Variable	Change rel. to benchmark
Wage	-3.2%
Price for health care	-0.4%
Health care expenditures per capita	-11%
Consumption expenditures per capita	-2.5%
Health share of GDP	-0.6 pp
Employment share in health care sector	-0.7 pp

Table 6: Macroeconomic variables for experiment (iii)

and (iii), such that climate change simultaneously increases mortality, uniformly for all age-groups, and reduces incomes through output losses.

Figure 10 illustrates how the combined scenario affects life-cycle decisions. Consumption is lower over the whole life-cycle in scenario (iv) compared to the benchmark run. Furthermore, the decrease is strongest among the elderly and weakest among the young, even in relative terms. This is consistent with experiments (i) and (iii), where in the former higher health expenditures decreased consumption expenditures and in particular pushed them towards earlier ages due to the strongly diminished life-expectancy, and in the latter, reduced incomes decreased consumption uniformly across the life-cycle.


Figure 10: Life-course consumption, health expenditures, capital and value of life profiles where the blue (solid) line denotes the baseline, the green (dashed) line experiment (iv)

Health expenditures are subject to two opposing forces. The income losses exert downward pressure on health care demand of all age groups, whereas the increased mortality pushes the demand in the opposite direction, at least for young age-groups. The combined effect, thus, results in an ambiguous impact on health care demand, its sign depending on the relative strength of each

24

effect. The very old reduce health expenditures considerably as their value of life does not only fall due to the diminished life expectancy and consequently because of the reduction of consumption allocated to these higher age-groups but also due to lower income and, thus, less consumption in general. Hence, the reductions in medical expenses in experiment (i) and (iii) reinforce each other for these older age-groups. Younger individuals, instead, increase health care expenditures in the light of higher mortality risk, despite the reduced income. With regard to their impact on savings and the value of life, both effects that we considered, the lowered income and the higher mortality risk reinforce each other, leading to a considerable reduction for all age-groups.

Table 7 reports how the macroeconomic variables respond to the climate-induced combined effect on mortality and production. Life expectancy in experiment (iv) falls due to mortality increases as seen in scenario (i) but also, to a smaller extent, through reductions in income (scenario (iii)), resulting in less demand of medical care that would otherwise work to reduce mortality. With regard to health expenditures we see that the increase of health expenditures in experiment (i) has been reversed by the income effect presented in experiment (iii). A similar picture emerges with respect to the health expenditure share of GDP and the health income tax. However, a precise calibration with respect to the expected effects on mortality and production would need to be conducted to make predictions about the magnitude and sign of the total effect on health expenditures of a given country or region. Yet, such an undertaking would likely fail due to the large uncertainty in estimates on mortality and income effects of climate change. Nonetheless, the implication of this numerical exercise is, most importantly, that health expenditures under climate change will be determined by two impact channels working in opposite directions. Regions that experience strong mortality effects with modest production losses will likely experience higher health care demand whereas other regions with predominantly income effects will decrease health spending.

Variable	Incr. in mortality (i)	Prod. losses (iii)	Combined (iv)
Life expectancy	-3.3 years	-0.2 years	-3.5 years
Health care exp. per capita	+7%	−11%	−4%
Health income tax	+0.4 pp	−0.7 pp	−0.2 pp
Health share of GDP	+0.4 pp	−0.6 pp	−0.2 pp

Table 7: Macroeconomic variables

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have developed a life-cycle framework to analyze the effects of climate change on individual consumption and medical expenditure decisions as well as on the aggregate health care demand. While predictions of the exact magnitude of these effects is subject to a calibration of expected (and often unknown) impacts on production and mortality of a specific economy, our model can shed light on the qualitative nature of climate change effects, some of which we summarize in the following.

First, there is an ambiguous climate-induced effect on health expenditures and the health share of a country. On the one hand, climate change lowers income, leading to a reduction in consumption and health expenditures. Due to a higher marginal utility of consumption at lower levels, health expenditures are more strongly reduced such that the health expenditure share falls. On the other hand, the increased base mortality induces individuals to spend, on average, more on health ex-

penditures. Hence, a trade off between the reducing effect of lower income on health expenditures and the boosting effect of higher mortality arises.

Second, the highest age-groups tend to reduce their health expenditures in the long run when facing higher mortality risks, even in the absence of a negative income effect. This is the result of relatively strongly diminished remaining life expectancy at high ages and a subsequent reduction in the value of life. Climate change, hence, might disproportionately affect the remaining life-expectancy and well-being of the elderly, an effect not caused but exacerbated by additional age-specific vulnerability to climate-induced mortality risks. However, in the short-term and when climate change impacts are unanticipated, individuals of all age-groups react to a higher mortality risk by investing additional resources into health care. The impact of climate change on health expenditures might, thus, vary strongly across different time scales.

Third, climate change is likely to have a negative effect on the value of life. This can imply an increase in risky or unhealthy behavior and lower incentives for protective investments, such as those relating to housing, working places and transport systems. Such an shift away from healthy behavior would present an indirect channel through which health is further deteriorated as a consequence of global warming. This can be interpreted as an adverse complementarity analogous to the favorable complementarity in the spirit of Murphy and Topel [2006] and Dow et al. [1999] where reductions in mortality for one cause increase the incentives to invest in health care affecting mortality from another cause.

Fourth, aggregate health care demand is subject to various forces and is crucially linked with life-cycle effects, the demographic structure of the population and the age-specific vulnerability profile of climate-induced health effects. Increases in aggregate health care demand are likely to be strongest when the young are predominantly affected by health risks and their population share is large. If the mortality of primarily higher age-groups is raised or the population is relatively old, smaller increases in health expenditures are to be expected. Health care demand can even fall in the presence of climate-induced mortality risk, if income losses are sufficiently strong.

This paper, thus, stresses the importance of considering life-cycle impacts in the estimation of the climate change effect on health care expenditures. Failing to account for the age-heterogeneity of health care demand or the linkage of income and health care demand via the value of life might bias these forecasts strongly. For example, the rise in health expenditures might be strongly overestimated when income effects are neglected or the negative effect of higher mortality on the value of life and, hence, the willingness to pay for survival is ignored. Studies that attempt to quantify climate-induced health costs should, thus, aim for a life-cycle perspective in their estimates, rather than relying on the static assumption, that rises in mortality and morbidity proportionally increase health spending. Moreover, our analysis suggests that aggregate health expenditure effects will be shaped by the age-vulnerability profile of climate-induced mortality impacts. Our insights into the mechanisms with which vulnerabilities across the population translate into a differential effect on health spending can be used in studies to better estimate aggregate effects and to identify particularly susceptible regions or populations.

In this paper, we are focusing on an open economy model, where the economy is assumed to be small enough such that is has no significant influence in the worldwide GHG emissions. Thus, an interesting extension of the model would consider a closed and emission-rich economy such as China or the US (or the world itself). In such a model one can examine the effects of taxation for the purpose of financing climate change mitigation as opposed to financing health care subsidies. Climate-induced health effects could, thus, not only be dealt with by adaption through medical care but also by mitigating increases in temperatures in the first place.

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A Appendix

A.1 Optimal solution to the Individual Life-cycle Problem

Following the age-structured maximum principle, the individual's life-cycle problem, i.e. the maximization of (4) subject to (6) and (7) can be expressed by the Hamiltonian

$$\mathcal{H} = uS - \lambda_S \mu S + \lambda_k \left[rk + lw - c - \phi p_H h - \tau + s \right],$$

leading to the first-order conditions

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{H}_c &= u_c S - \lambda_k = 0, & (29) \\
\mathcal{H}_h &= -\lambda_S \mu_h S - \lambda_k \phi p_H = 0, & (30)
\end{aligned}
$$

and the adjoint equations

$$
\begin{aligned}
\dot{\lambda}_S &= (\rho + \mu) \lambda_S - u, & (31) \\
\dot{\lambda}_k &= (\rho - r) \lambda_k. & (32)
\end{aligned}
$$

Evaluating equation (29) at two different ages/years (a, t) and $(\widehat{a}, t + \widehat{a} - a)$, equating the terms and rearranging gives

$$
\begin{aligned}
\frac{u_c (\widehat{a}, t + \widehat{a} - a)}{u_c (a, t)} &= \frac{\lambda_k (\widehat{a}, t + \widehat{a} - a)}{\lambda_k (a, t)} \frac{S (a, t)}{S (\widehat{a}, t + \widehat{a} - a)} \\
\Leftrightarrow \frac{u_c (\widehat{a}, t + \widehat{a} - a)}{u_c (a, t)} &= \exp \left\{ \int_a^{\widehat{a}} \left[\rho + \mu \left(\widehat{\widehat{a}}, t + \widehat{\widehat{a}} - a \right) - r \left(t + \widehat{\widehat{a}} - a \right) \right] d\widehat{\widehat{a}} \right\} \\
\Leftrightarrow \frac{u_c (c (a, t))}{e^{-\rho(\widehat{a}-a)} u_c (c (\widehat{a}, t + \widehat{a} - a))} &= \exp \left\{ \int_a^{\widehat{a}} \left[r \left(t + \widehat{\widehat{a}} - a \right) - \mu \left(\widehat{\widehat{a}}, t + \widehat{\widehat{a}} - a \right) \right] d\widehat{\widehat{a}} \right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

which equals equation (16).

In order to obtain a solution for λ_S, we integrate (31) which gives

$$\lambda_S (a, t) = \int_a^\omega u (\widehat{a}, t + \widehat{a} - a) \exp \left[-\int_a^{\widehat{a}} (\rho + \mu) \, d\widehat{\widehat{a}} \right] d\widehat{a}.$$

Using the definition of the value of life, see (17), we can express it analogously as

$$\psi (a, t) := \frac{\lambda_S (a, t)}{u_c (a, t)} = \int_a^\omega \frac{u_c (\widehat{a}, t + \widehat{a} - a)}{u_c (a, t)} \frac{u (\widehat{a}, t + \widehat{a} - a)}{u_c (\widehat{a}, t + \widehat{a} - a)} \exp \left[-\int_a^{\widehat{a}} (\rho + \mu) \, d\widehat{\widehat{a}} \right] d\widehat{a}.$$

Substituting from the Euler equation (16) and rearranging we obtain equation (18). Inserting (29) into (30) allows to rewrite the first-order condition for health care as

$$-\mu_h (a, t) \psi(a, t) = \phi (t) p_H (t).$$

which gives equation (20).

A.2 The evolution of consumption and health expenditures over the life-course

Total differentiation of (29) with respect to time gives

$$
\begin{aligned}
& u_{cc}S\dot{c} + u_c\dot{S} - \dot{\lambda}_k \\
= & \ u_{cc}S\dot{c} - u_c\mu S - (\rho - r)\lambda_k \\
= & \ u_{cc}S\dot{c} - [\rho - r + \mu]\,u_c S = 0.
\end{aligned}
$$

From this we obtain the dynamics of consumption given in equation (22). Total differentiation of (20) with respect to time gives

$$
-\left(\mu_{hh}\dot{h} + \mu_{ha} + \mu_{hT}\dot{T}\right)\psi - \mu_h\dot{\psi} - \dot{\phi}p_H - \phi\dot{p}_H = 0
$$

from which we obtain the dynamics for health care as,

$$
\dot{h} = \frac{-1}{\mu_{hh}}\left(\mu_{ha} + \mu_{hT}\dot{T} + \frac{\dot{\phi}p_H + \phi\dot{p}_H + \mu_h\dot{\psi}}{\psi}\right),
$$

which is easily transformed into equation (23).

A.3 Equilibrium Relationships with Cobb-Douglas Technologies

In the numerical simulation of our model we will use Cobb-Douglas specifications for the production functions. In the following, we show that the set of prices and market allocations $\{w(t), p_H(t), L_Y(t), K_Y(t)\}$ can be expressed in terms of the interest rate $r(t)$ and temperature deviation $T(t)$. This insight will be used in the numerical solution of the model.
Consider the Cobb-Douglas-specifications

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y(t) &= \Lambda_Y(t)K_Y(t)^\alpha\,[L_Y(t)]^{1-\alpha} & (33)\\
F(t) &= \Lambda_H(t)K_H(t)^\beta\,[L_H(t)]^{1-\beta}, & (34)
\end{aligned}
$$

with $\alpha, \beta \in [0, 1]$.
From the first-order conditions (24), (25), (26) and (27) we then obtain the factor demand functions

$$
\begin{aligned}
K_Y^d(t) &= \frac{\alpha Y(t)}{r(t) + \delta}, & (35)\\[2mm]
L_Y^d(t) &= \frac{(1-\alpha)\,Y(t)}{w(t)}, & (36)\\[2mm]
K_H^d(t) &= \frac{\beta p_H(t)F(t)}{r(t) + \delta}, & (37)\\[2mm]
L_H^d(t) &= \frac{(1-\beta)p_H(t)F(t)}{w(t)}. & (38)
\end{aligned}
$$

Combining (35) with (36) and (37) with (38) we obtain the equilibrium capital intensity

$$
\begin{aligned}
k_Y^*(t) &:= \frac{K_Y^d(t)}{L_Y^d(t)} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\frac{w(t)}{r(t)+\delta}, & (39)\\[2mm]
k_H^*(t) &:= \frac{K_H^d(t)}{L_H^d(t)} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\frac{w(t)}{r(t)+\delta}. & (40)
\end{aligned}
$$

and, thus, $K_Y^d(t) = k_Y^*(t)L_Y^d(t)$. Using $k_Y^*(t)$ in (33) to rewrite $Y(t) = \Lambda_Y(t)L_Y^d(t)(k_Y^*)^\alpha$ and inserting this in (36) we can solve for the equilibrium wage:

$$w^*(t) = (1 - \alpha)\,\Lambda_Y(t)\left[\frac{\alpha}{r(t) + \delta}\right]^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}.$$

Note, that $\Lambda_Y(t)$ is determined by Temperature $T(t)$ as well as by other exogenously given parameters. Hence, we can determine the wage rate based on the market interest rate $r(t)$ and the temperature deviation. The wage rate can now be used to determine the capital intensities $k_Y^*(t)$ and $k_H^*(t)$. Using the market clearing condition $F(t) = H^d(t)$ and (37) and (38) we obtain the general equilibrium price for health care as

$$p_H^*(t) = \frac{1}{\Lambda_H(t)}\frac{(r(t) + \delta)^\beta w(t)^{1-\beta}}{\beta^\beta(1 - \beta)^{1-\beta}}.$$

Using (38) we can determine the optimal labor demand in the health care sector, $L_H^*(t)$. The labor market equilibrium then determines

$$L_Y^*(t) = L(t) - L_H^*(t)$$

and the macroeconomic allocations are fully characterized.

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