9 Organizational forms

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Most capitalist societies emerged from feudal relations and, in most countries, rules of dynastic succession moved from agrarian sectors to the ownership and control of large firms. However industrial workers (and, sometimes, managers) proved to be better than serfs at organizing a resistance against dynastic privileges. In most European countries, unions and social democracy were an important factor in the democratization of European societies, which emerged as a reaction to the exclusive powers of the new industrial aristocracy. The United States was a remarkable exception to this path. In the US, the establishment of a strong democracy preceded the growth of big business and the power of the capitalist dynasties was politically and culturally constrained. Whereas a variety of European “aristocratic political origins” tended to move the economy toward a “concentrated equilibrium” with large block holders and strong unions, the American “democratic political origins” set the conditions for “the Berle and Means public company”. Managerial power emerged in a “dispersed equilibrium” with fragmented ownership and weak unions.

In this context the development of organizational forms in Europe’s south-east usually simply is interpreted as just another lagged trajectory of the same evolution that was observed in Western European countries. Few authors would indeed look further back in the past, to the ancient world in the eastern Mediterranean, to discover elements of organizational forms that still exert some influence on contemporary societies. As described in Chapter 6, the part of the world governed by Constantinople in these days was characterized by a strong hierarchical exploitation system, which had developed many meso-levels of direct coercive power, military power, to cover a very large geographical area. No doubt, a necessary complement to this physical power pyramid had to be an ideological exertion of power, a dominating information policy, which produced expectations in all parts of society that were able to stabilize its development. Physical punishment had to be present as expected punishment in every single mind of every individual living in this empire. To keep these expectations alive sporadic demonstrations of cruel punishment in front of the eyes of some potential disbelievers constituted an important element of governance – and the cheaper manipulation by communication became, the more often ideological power could substitute direct coercion.
The ways in which ideological power – the manipulation of internal models of social agents by communication to influence their actions – were exerted were always diverse. They range from word-of-mouth campaigns and local folklore to full-fledged institutional forms enforcing belief in a certain religion. A most interesting property of ancient empires was that at the meso-levels of their power hierarchies they often allowed for a certain amount of tolerance – in questions of the autonomy of coercion styles as well as in questions of religion. This, of course, had to do with the very restricted abilities of the transport systems available at the time, which forced the hegemon of a large empire to accept a certain amount of cultural diversity. The art of the rulers in Rome and later in Constantinople consisted of achieving relatively binding arrangements with their local representatives along the borders of their empires, despite severe cultural differences. In the end it is the very success of the expansion of an empire that leads to its implosion. Neither troops nor ideology were able to keep all regions under the same political umbrella; the ancient world made room for the Dark Ages.

In this process of decay the eastern Mediterranean experienced a very special evolution. In its north a hierarchical structure of coercive power was rapidly reinstalled and held alive, basically till World War I. In its south the ideological element of power, namely the power of institutionalized religion, took over all agendas. Political Islam, as it would be labeled today, conquered the southern shores of the Mediterranean and even moved north to Spain. The north, in times of the Osman Empire, cultivated and refined the techniques of governance inherited from the ancient past, though enriched by a different monotheistic religion: Islam instead of Christianity. The Millet system that was used as clutch between economic and political rigidities and religious diversity was an instrument with astonishing success. It is this type of social innovation – taking known elements and gluing them together in a new combination, to paraphrase Schumpeter – that can count as a characteristic form of organization in Europe’s south-east. Nevertheless the south-east and the west of Europe both were feudal from the point of view of political economy during the Middle Ages. As Antonio Gramsci thoughtfully noted, the ruling class in feudalism historically derived its dominance from military superiority, from displaying extraordinary abilities in exploiting other parts of society by direct coercion of power. And so it was military inferiority with respect to Western Europe that in the end made Turkey look like “Europe’s Old Man” before World War I. At that time the change toward capitalism had been already well on its way in Western Europe as well as in Britain’s former colony in North America.

To return to the emergence of the currently prevailing organizational forms of capitalism, the Anglo-Saxon model in the USA and the European model, proves to be important for shedding light on the respective prospects for Europe’s south-east. It thus is this debate to which we will turn next.

The recent good performance of the American economy has had an effect similar to that of the earlier successes of the Japanese and the German economies in the 1980s and 1990s. There has been a rush to imitate her institutions and, in particular, the public company. In this case, the pressure has been particularly
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strong. Some authors have claimed that we have reached “the end of history for corporate law” or, in other words, an inevitable universal convergence toward the Anglo-Saxon model (Hansmann, Kraakman 2004). Other authors (Aoki 2001, Bebchuk and Roe 2004, Pagano 2006, Schimdt and Spindler 2004) have claimed that, for a rich variety of reasons, the development of corporate ownership and governance systems is likely to be path-dependent and, to explain the persistent plurality of corporate systems, have focused on the complementarities existing among different domains of the economic system.

In this chapter we build on this last stream of the literature. We try to integrate the arguments put forward in Roe (1994, 2003), developing some of the points contained in Belloc and Pagano (2009, 2013). We seek to support the hypothesis that different political and social origins have shaped the corporate governance systems of different countries.

As argued by Roe (2003), different political conditions such as social democracy set limits on the corporate governance systems. However, different corporate governance systems can generate different political reactions. For instance, social democracy can be seen as a set of political conditions impeding the separation between ownership and control and the development of the public company. At the same time, social democracy can be seen also as a reaction to a concentrated family-based corporate governance system. In Belloc and Pagano (2009, 2013) we show that causation runs both ways: from politics from corporate governance and vice versa. In general, politics and corporate governance are likely to co-evolve.

Is there, however, a moment in history that has been decisive in shaping this process of cumulative causation?

In this chapter we try to provide more evidence in favor of the idea that the process was, in the end, shaped by its “political origins”. By “political origins” of a country we mean the political conditions that existed when “big business” emerged in that country. We will distinguish between “democratic” and “aristocratic” political origins and we will advance the hypothesis that these origins pushed the system in two different directions.

If a robust democratic system has already emerged by the time of the development of the large enterprises, the concentration of economic power is likely to be limited by political action. Also the power of the unions faces similar limitations. Moreover, in this situation, neither the employers nor the workers have a strong incentive to balance the concentration of power of the other side. In this sense a “dispersed equilibrium” is likely to have “democratic origins”.

By contrast, “concentrated equilibria” are likely to have “aristocratic origins”.

If, by the time of the development of the large capitalist enterprises, a robust democratic system has not yet emerged, the unchecked concentration of power of the capitalist dynasties may go well beyond their private wealth. In this case, unions and social-democratic power are likely to rise as a counterbalance and be an important ingredient in a late democratization of society. The end result of this process may be that both workers and employers find the motivation of the
concentration of their own interests in the high degree of concentration of the other side and this equilibrium may be rather stable.

The chapter is structured as follows.

The following section considers the different collective action problems faced by owners, managers and workers when they try to obtain safeguards for their specific investments. There can be complementarities or trade-offs among these safeguards, often leading to arms races and to multiple equilibria that are characterized by different incentives to invest for each social group. The third section focuses on two idealized cases of “democratic” and “aristocratic” origins and on the mechanisms by which each type of “political origin” may select a particular type of equilibrium. In the fourth section we consider in detail how that mechanism may work in the considerable European variety of “aristocratic origins” and in the unique case of American “democratic origins”. In the fifth section we criticize the hypothesis that there is presently a single “Anglo-Saxon” model of corporate governance common to the UK and US. In the final section we extend our argument to other contemporary capitalist economies and return to the discussion of the organization forms in South-east Europe.

Safeguards for specificity and collective action

In a recent paper, Oliver Williamson (2006) observes that labor markets and financial markets share an important characteristic, which distinguishes them from intermediate product markets: in both cases, the individuals who make specific investments face, at the same time, a collective action problem.

Information asymmetries characterize both cases. However, according to Williamson, the asymmetric information problem is more serious in the case of the relationship between shareholders and directors and involves that the latter can easily collude with top management. The integrity of delegation of decision-making, which is the most remarkable advantage of the public company, would be lost if shareholders have to re-balance information asymmetries in a way similar to that characterizing the relationship between the workers and their representatives. Thus, according to Williamson, shareholder democracy can easily degenerate into oligarchy.

In our view, the main difference between the collective action problems, faced by workers and shareholders, is related to the inseparability between human capital and its owner. The problem of “absentee ownership” is obviously less severe in the case of human capital. Even very absent-minded individuals cannot be really absent when their human capital is being used by others. Unsurprisingly, information asymmetry between workers and union leaders is less severe than that which may emerge between shareholders and directors.

Besides the impossibility of absentee ownership, the human capital of an individual is also characterized by the fact that others cannot own it. For this reason, the ownership of human capital is also characterized by two other restrictions. On the one hand, all the human capital of an individual must be concentrated in the hands of that individual. On the other hand the ownership of different
Individuals must be dispersed among them. The ownership of shares is, for this reason, potentially more concentrated and more dispersed than that of human capital. One does not need to own all the shares of a firm in the same way in which we have to own all the shares of own human capital. At the same time, one can be owner of shares of different firms while, in modern societies, it is impossible to own percentages of other human beings.

If we focus our attention only on the fact that we must concentrate the ownership of all our human capital, whereas we may disperse the ownership of shares, we reach Williamson's conclusion: the collective action of the shareholders is harder to overcome than the collective action problem of the shareholders.

However, also the opposite may be true. The ownership of capital cannot only be dispersed but also can be more concentrated than that of labour. From this point of view, shareholders can overcome their collective action problem more easily than the workers. There are many ways in which owners can concentrate their ability to control capital well beyond what would be allowed by their personal wealth. One of them has recently attracted much attention in the literature: the possibility of building pyramids by which, in a long cascade, some firms control other firms.

Within certain limits, there may be no trade-offs between employers' and workers' safeguards. Both of them can contribute to high levels of investments and to efficiency. However, after a certain limit, a trade-off among these safeguards will exist. Moreover, in many cases, the safeguards that are necessary to protect the investments of one group of individuals will depend on the level of safeguards that are achieved by the others. Weak safeguards for both capital and labour and robust safeguards for both factors may define the key ingredients of two self-sustaining equilibria, which are analogous to the high and low armament equilibria arising in a standard arms race game.

Also non-owning managers need safeguards for their specific investments in human capital. Managers are often required to make “second-order” specific investments to govern the relations arising from the specific investments of other agents. In the case of these specific investments, the general purpose rules and enforcement, which govern “public markets”, may be inadequate. Managers are required to set up and to rule private orderings, which are “specifically” designed to deal with these specific investments.

Managers could try to achieve an “efficiency frontier” where, given a certain level of their own specific investments, the investments of the other individuals (workers and shareholders) are stimulated as much as possible by using appropriate safeguards. However, also in these cases, at least along this efficiency frontier, some trade-offs are likely to arise. If workers have strong safeguards in their jobs, managers may lack the authority to carry out their plans and to safeguard their own specific investments in human capital. Vice versa, an excessive authority of managers may easily jeopardize workers’ specific investments. Similarly, arrangements, such that shareholders can fire or sue the managers very easily, may give strong safeguards for financial investments but they may discourage the (second-order) specific investments of the managers. Vice versa,
if managers have a high degree of job security, their specific investments in their company may be encouraged but their security may scare shareholders who may find it too difficult to get rid of an opportunistic manager.

Since the ownership of capital can be more concentrated or more dispersed than that of labor-power, we cannot a priori say which factor may more easily overcome its collective action problems and, eventually, gain more safeguards at the expense of other factors. There is, however, an interesting asymmetry.

The control of capital can be concentrated by the means of ordinary market transactions well beyond that of labor-power and, thanks to devices such as pyramids, also well beyond the wealth of the richest families. Thus, in the absence of political constraints, when economies to scale favor large-scale enterprises, the ownership of capital will be easily concentrated in few hands by the means of ordinary market contracts. By contrast, labor interests cannot be concentrated by using simple economic transactions. A collective action problem must necessarily be solved. For this reason, “political origins” do matter.

A strong democracy may find the unilateral concentration of economic wealth in a few dynasties unhealthy and set limits to the process of concentration of economic power in few hands. This may also limit the incentives of labor to organize to balance the concentrated interests of the owning dynasties.

By contrast, if a strong democracy is absent and there is a widespread acceptance of dynastic rules, a few families can easily rule large enterprises. In this case, after some time, a social democratic reaction is likely to take place with the result that both the interests of the owners and of the workers achieve a very concentrated representation.

Only if a democracy was well established at the time when large enterprises became so important for economic development, the concentration of interests of capital owners could be tamed. The “Berle and Means Corporation” may require fairly uncommon “political origins”.

Aristocratic and democratic origins of corporate governance

In this section, we will consider two idealized extreme cases of “democratic” and “aristocratic” political origins (whereas in the following section we will try to refer to some real life historical processes).

The case of “aristocratic origins” can be schematized in this way. Society had been used for a long time to a concentration of political and economic power in the hands of few families (the royal family and the aristocracy). The rule of dynastic succession had been accepted as the legitimate way of transmitting political and economic power and upward mobility was strongly discouraged: individuals were supposed to fill the same social roles as their parents and upwardly mobile individuals were often despised. When large firms became the best suited for economic development, the new industrial aristocracy, which controlled them even beyond the means of their considerable wealth, was not challenged by an established democracy. The new industrial giants were embedded in a society where, in spite of numerous rebellions, dynastic power was still widespread and
accepted as legitimate. Capitalist dynasties could increase their power thanks to their own wealth and to the accumulation of capital that large-scale firms allowed. They could also extend their control beyond their wealth thanks to pyramids and other financial arrangements. Members of the large owning families served as managers of the firms. Small shareholders had no chance to fire these “dynastic” managers and professional managers were confronted with a socially exclusive wealthy group, which enjoyed a “de facto” tenure thanks to its family links. Faced with the concentrated interests of capitalist dynasties, workers reacted by concentrating their interests into unions and social-democratic parties.

The story of “democratic origins” can be told in an analogous way. In this case society’s wealth was relatively dispersed and political power was handled (often excluding the large majority of society) only by the means of some democratic mechanism. The rule of dynastic succession had been removed from the political arena (even if it was widespread in the economic arena which was dominated by small firms). Individuals were not supposed to fill the same social roles as their parents and upwardly mobile individuals commanded high social esteem. When, in many sectors, large firms emerged as the most efficient form of organization, the extension of dynastic rule to these organizations met the opposition of a large part of society. Smaller owners were scared to be out-competed by large organizations, minority shareholders were ready to defend their rights, professional managers felt cheated by the role that family connections had in their careers and, most important, the politicians, who had gained their office by the means of democratic competition, felt threatened by the power of the new industrial aristocracies. Industrial dynasties were not allowed to increase their power beyond the limits of their wealth and faced a sharp choice between the advantages of asset diversification and those of concentrated control. In the absence of dynastic concentrated control, also workers’ incentive to concentrate their power in unions was rather weak. In this situation, professional managers became the rulers of “Bearle and Means” corporation.

There are several reasons for which different political origins could entrench each system of corporate governance. We will focus on two reasons that stem from the analysis carried out in the preceding section.

The first reason is considered by Mark Roe’s theory (2003) that relates concentrated control with social democracy.

Even if the growth of strong unions and social democracy may have been, initially, stimulated by the pre-existence of concentrated private dynastic power, their formation makes the persistence of this power more likely. Once strong unions exist, professional managers are more likely to be captured by the interests of the workers. Shareholders need to concentrate their interests to balance the safeguards and rights, which the workers may obtain. A “concentrated equilibrium” may arise where both the workers and the majority block holder have strong safeguards, while managers (and often minority shareholders) and have weak safeguards.

By contrast, a “dispersed equilibrium” may arise if the concentrated control of the large firms is not allowed to arise. In this case a fair internal labor market
may weaken the incentive to unionize. In this equilibrium, even if the weakness
of the unions may be also an effect of the dispersion of the ownership, owners
can delegate control to managers because unions are weak. This “disarmament
equilibrium” generates the implicit conditions necessary for the high degree of
managerial independence that characterize the “Berle and Means” corporation.

The second reason for which the dispersed and concentrated equilibria may
be rather stable has to do with the “specificity argument” that we considered in
the preceding section.

Different political origins favor safeguards and rights that, in turn, stimulate
particular specific investment, biasing technology in a certain direction. Rights
and safeguards stimulate specific investments and, in turn, sunk specific invest-
ments favor the organization of vested interests, reinforcing these safeguards and
rights. Thus, self-reinforcing multiple organizational equilibria may arise from
the interaction between the nature of the factors that are used and the allocation
of property rights and may define different paths of institutional and technolo-
gical change.

For instance, a “concentrated equilibrium” creates strong safeguards for the
members of the owning family to make specific investments in the firm and,
because of the “counterbalancing” safeguards; also workers may have some
similar incentives. By contrast, in this equilibrium managers have weak incen-
tives to make these specific investments.

At the same time, the existence of these specific investments makes both
family owners and workers more willing to increase their security in the organiza-
tion. The opposite argument holds for professional managers who may not claim
appropriate safeguards for their specific skills because, in the absence of these
safeguards, they have invested negligible amounts in firm-specific human capital.

The distribution of rights tends to generate complementary technologies,
which entrench the status quo.

Because of these two mechanisms (and because of some of other mechanisms
such as those considered in Morck et al. 2005), aristocratic and democratic
origins can entrench corporate governance systems in a “concentrated” or “dis-
persed” equilibrium.

However, in our argument, “concentration” and “dispersion” are referred only
to the organization of the interests of owners and workers. In terms of the size of
the firms, the implications may be rather different. A “concentrated equilibrium”
may well be characterized by firms that tend to be smaller than those character-
izing a “dispersed equilibrium”. Even if family dynasties may have numerous
means to expand their control well beyond the limits set by their wealth, there
are limits to this type of expansion. In frequent cases, the only possible way to
keep the firm under control may be to limit its size and, often, its efficiency.

The classic model and the American exception

Most countries have gone through a laborious transition from the feudal order,
typical of agrarian societies, to some form of capitalist organization. At the time
of the second industrial revolution, when large firms started to become dominant in some sectors, the residual political prestige of the aristocracy and the aristocratic aspirations of the bourgeoisie were still evident. In this broad picture, the United States has been an important exception.

With reference to the scheme considered in the preceding chapter, there is a striking asymmetry. While the case of aristocratic origins covers many historical cases, the case of democratic origins includes only one case. Indeed, there are so many historical cases of aristocratic origins that contrasting a stylized classic general model of aristocratic origins to the American experience has obvious limitations.

With the exception of the US, in all the other major capitalist economies, large organizations had aristocratic origins in the specific sense outlined in the preceding section: at the time of the second industrial revolution, when large firms became important, aristocratic dynastic succession had still a strong legitimacy in society, cultural class barriers were strong and accepted and the aristocracy had still a disproportionate influence in political affairs. A process of democratization was usually taking place in these countries but, unlike the case of the US, this process was heavily influenced by the various roles that the landed aristocracy had had in the process of capitalist development.

In his classic book, Barrington Moore (1973) pointed out that the behavior of the landed aristocracy was rather different in the industrializing European countries.

In England a strong landed aristocracy was the leading factor in the initial phase of the process of modernization. It was open to some integration of other wealthy individuals and adopted a positive attitude towards the process of industrialization. It was the most important force in the “puritan revolution”, leading eventually to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. However, because of the flexibility of the British aristocracy, all sorts of dynastic privileges had a strong legitimacy at the time of the second industrial revolution. Members of the families belonging to the proper aristocratic circles, were controlling firms well beyond their financial possibilities and a proper non-class biased managerial career was rather difficult. On the other side of the social divide, class barriers gave strong incentives for the development of strong unions and of socialist politics. For a long time, a “concentrated equilibrium” characterized British firms. We will consider, in the following section, in which sense this equilibrium has disintegrated and whether it is legitimate to talk of an “Anglo-American” model of corporate governance. For the moment, we can observe that, in spite (or, perhaps, because) of the metamorphosis of the British aristocracy, it is appropriate to consider Britain as an evident case of “aristocratic origins” of corporate governance.

Whereas the aristocracy became an important active force in British economic and political transformation, the French aristocracy continued to rely on traditional feudal privileges. In England, a mutating aristocracy carried out the process of modernization against the king. In France, with the support of an emerging bourgeois class and of a growing centralized bureaucracy, the king
imposed modernization on a static aristocracy. French absolutism rather than
British aristocratic parliamentary democracy was the prevailing trend before the
French revolution, which, in some respects, completed the work of the Bour-
bons. While the French revolution gave a democratic turn to the modernization
of France, the post-Napoleonic reaction implied that, at the time of the second
industrial revolution, class barriers and aristocratic political privileges were still
important in France.¹¹ In order to get top managerial jobs, proper manners and
good family connections mattered more than abilities and hard work. Workers
reacted to class barriers by forming unions and engaging in various rebellious
activities.

France and England had taken different paths to democratization and mod-
ernization. However, at the time of the second industrial revolution, both coun-
tries were still characterized by a pervasive political power of the aristocracy and
by a widespread acceptance of dynastic privilege. In both countries, most indi-
viduals who were excluded from this system of privileges, started organizing in
unions and socialist parties while many professional managers had little auto-
nomy and power in their firms.

The weight of the aristocracy in other European countries, which industrial-
ized later, was even heavier. In England the landed aristocracy adopted many
entrepreneurial habits. The opposite relation held in Germany. “In nineteenth-
century Prussia the members of the bourgeoisie who became connected with the
aristocracy generally absorbed the latter’s habits and outlook” (Moore 1973
p. 37). Because of this behavior, by the second half of the nineteenth century, the
process of democratization was not only incomplete but also very uncertain. Not
surprisingly, the resulting German “concentrated equilibrium” took a much more
authoritarian, and sometimes tragic, path.

In spite of the numerous differences, all these countries shared the disability
of the political system to tame the power of new industrial dynasties associated
to the growth of big business. The challenge to this power could only come,
later, when the individuals who were excluded from these privileges could
organize their interests. The only exception to this general pattern was the US.¹²

Since the early beginnings, the British North American colonies had been a
refuge from aristocratic and ecclesiastical authority. Moreover by the time of the
second industrial revolution, the United States had gone through two major
democratic revolutions: the war of independence and the civil war. With the
major exceptions of the Afro-Americans and of pre-Colombian populations, the
US approximated the democratic origins considered in the preceding section.

From the beginning, the Constitution was shaped by the idea that only an
appropriate system of checks and balances can support individual freedom or
that, in Madison’s words, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition”.¹³
“A properly designed state, the Fathers believed, would check interest with
interest, class with class, faction with faction and one branch of government with
another in harmonious system of mutual frustration” (Hofstadter 1967 p. 8).

The “Fathers” were aware that an adequate mechanism of reciprocal guaran-
tees should not rely only on the Constitution. In their view, it was also important
that economic power was not concentrated in few hands. Jefferson's democracy
relied on a society where wealth was diffused among educated farmers and
where economic power could not be monopolized. In this vein, as early as 1832,
President Andrew Jackson confronted the power of the Bank of the United
States. He vetoed the re-charter of the Bank and won a populist presidential re-
election campaign in defense of the "humble people of society" against "exclusive privileges" (Hofstadter p. 60). The free soil ideology, allowed by the
moving western frontier, offered the material arguments to sustain freedom and
widespread small ownership and, with Abraham Lincoln, generated the unifying
feeling of the Union against the pro-slavery states of the south. Lincoln insisted
that the new Territories should offer "homes for free white people" and that this
could not be if slavery was planted within them. Slave states were places for
poor white people "to remove from, not to remove to".15

The victory of the Union implied that the slave-owning landed aristocracy
lost its power in the United States. After the civil war, no variety of landed
aristocracy had a relevant role in the political and economic organization of
American society. By the time of the second industrial revolution, the distrust
for concentrated economic power was already well rooted in US society.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, President Theodore Roosevelt
could apply the antitrust law against Morgan and Rockefeller. The Sherman act,
which had already been promulgated in 1890, could be used against both busi-
ess combinations and workers' unions (for the first years, the latter was the pre-vailing application). In this way, Roosevelt could continue a battle, which could,
somehow, remind the confrontation of President Jackson with the Bank of the
United States. President Theodore Roosevelt was frightened by big business
more for political than for economic reasons. "He was not a small entrepreneur,
worrying about being squeezed out, nor an ordinary consumer concerned about
rising prices, but a big politician facing a strong rival in the business of achiev-
ing power" (Hofstadter p. 222).

Big business was accepted as a necessary development of the second indus-
trial revolution. The problem faced by Roosevelt, was how to make big business
and the growing power of the unions compatible with democracy. Theodore
Roosevelt believed that the survival of independent political power implied that
both capital and labor should accept the regulation of the state. "Because he
feared the great corporations as well as the organized workers and farmers, Roo-
sevelt came to think of himself as representing the golden mean" (Hofstadter
p. 217). Both concentrated powers had to be tamed and somehow dispersed.
However, in the case of business, the dispersion of the power of the owners was
not intended to limit the size of the firm.

Even if with different tones, the American political tradition, started by Jef-
ferson and Jackson, continued also with President Wilson and, later, with Pres-
ident Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In his 1912 electoral campaign Wilson clarified
even better in which sense the power of big business should be tamed, maintain-
ing that the real danger was not "the existence of the great individual combina-
tions" but the "combination of the combinations". "What we have to do [he said]
is to disentangle this colossal community of interests ... to pull apart, and gently but firmly and persistently dissect". The asymmetric nature of this dissection became very clear in the 1914 Clayton Act. Section 6 of the Clayton Act blocked the possibility to apply antitrust law against labour:

The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help.

By contrast, with respect to the Sherman act, the Clayton act reinforced the bite of antitrust action against big business. According to section 7 of the Act, the ownership by one corporation of stock of another was forbidden whenever

the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially used to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.

Many years later (in 1957), considering the *US vs Dupont* antitrust case (related to the acquisition of the 23 percent of GM in 1917–19, a few years after the Clayton act) the Supreme Court of the United States furnished a definitive interpretation of the limitations concerning the acquisition of stocks. The Supreme Court clarified that the anticompetitive circumstances, due to the acquisition of stock, could emerge much later after the moment of the acquisition of stock. The acquisition of stock could be challenged at any time (as in this case many years after the acquisition) and, moreover, the threat of limiting competition could arise independently of the good or bad intentions of the agents and could be applied to both vertical and horizontal acquisition (the *US vs Dupont* case concerned a vertical acquisition). Even if section 7, in the words of the dissenting Mr Justice Burton had been a "sleeping giant", the threat of waking up Wilson's creature contributed to his explicit goal to "gently but firmly and persistently dissect" the "combinations of combinations".

Indeed, the act pushed the wealthy owners of stock toward two extreme choices. One option was to disperse their stocks and have little control in each one of them. The other option was to concentrate their stock in one business and enjoy the benefits of control and forgive the advantages of diversification. The first option was often considered to be safer for the offspring of the entrepreneur while the second was more appropriate for initial innovative entrepreneurship and temporary take-overs of an inefficient managerial firm to be resold on the market. "Democratic origins" inhibited the possibility of choosing an "intermediate solution" that was so typical in the "aristocratic origin countries": the possibility of diversifying in related business without losing control. In those countries, with the help of political power and financial institutions and with the use of pyramids, a new industrial aristocracy could keep its power and could profit by forms of "tunnelling".
The anti-dynastic nature of the American model of corporate governance was even more clearly spelled out by President Frank Delano Roosevelt who denounced the “economic royalists” who gathered other people’s money. He could, again, vindicate a coherent line in the “American political tradition”. “The country is going through a repetition of Jackson’s fight with the Bank of the United States – only a far bigger and broader basis” (quoted in Roe 1994 p. 40).

Roosevelt denounced the “economic royalists” who “gathered other people’s money” to “impose a new industrial dictatorship” and who, by devices such as holding companies, have taken unwarranted economic power (Roe 1994 p. 40). This “Economic Royalism” of the very few was leading to a form of “private socialism”. Roosevelt believed that only the fragmentation of finance could lead to the kind “dispersed equilibrium” considered in the preceding section and avoid the danger of “government socialism”. He claimed “I am against private socialism of concentrated economic power as thoroughly as I am against government socialism. The one is equally as dangerous as the other; and destruction of private socialism is utterly essential to avoid government socialism” (quoted in Roe p. 39).

The first Roosevelt administration associated pyramidal business groups with corporate governance problems, market power and an objectionable concentration of economic power. The double (and multiple) taxation of dividends paid by one firm to another (intercorporate dividends) was explicitly included in the 1930s as a part of a package of tax and other policies aimed at eliminating US pyramidal business groups (Morck 2004). The programme, which was, already, spelled out in Wilson’s Clayton act became effective. The destruction of private socialism, made by the pyramidal business groups, became an irreversible characteristic of American corporate governance and, in this way the “Berle and Means public companies”, characterized by the separation of ownership and control, became an exceptional characteristic of its economy.

One could trace the social and political roots of American society in “Jefferson’s educated farmers” with their respect for religious tolerance and their exit from any form royal or dynastic rule and claim that these roots had been strong enough to create conditions of democratic origins for big business. The impact of “Lord and peasant in the making in the modern world” had taken many ways outside America. Only in the case of the US, the growth of their big business was not conditioned by one form or another of aristocratic origins and the timely fragmentation of finance and ownership could eventually lead before World War II to a “dispersed equilibrium”.

As we anticipated in the preceding section, this equilibrium was dispersed in terms of ownership but was characterised by the largest firms of the world.

Dispersion of ownership and centralized managerial control implied that firms could grow beyond the limitations due to the financial (and often “political”) means of the controlling family. It was more than true that the policies, rooted in American social and political origins, were not against big business but against the concentrated power of their owners. In many cases, checking this power was necessary to make big business really big.
An Anglo-Saxon model?

In much economic and political literature, there is a great emphasis on an Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American model (sometimes also related to the common law legal origins that these countries have shared). The analysis of the preceding section, stressing the importance of “aristocratic and democratic political origins” has rather put some emphasis on “American exceptionalism” with respect to the numerous countries that had some form of “aristocratic origins”.

Given this variety of aristocratic origins, there is no doubt that the type of political origins that has characterized Britain has contributed to push her closer to the American model than the other European countries. It is enough to mention only a few of the many similarities between the two countries. They shared a common history, have a common language and the British puritan revolution had an important impact on the nature of the “American Soul”. Moreover, both countries were characterized by the remarkable stability of their democratic political institutions.

However, in this section, we will try to argue that, in spite of these similarities, the different political origins had a strong impact and that Britain’s partial and late shift to a model of “dispersed equilibrium” is consistent with our story.

According to Chandler, in the last half of the nineteenth century

(1990 p. 2)

While, according to Chandler, the coming of managerial capitalism made the US one of the two most important actors of the second industrial revolution (the other one being Germany), Britain – the main actor of the first industrial revolution – became a late industrializer in many of the new industries. In Britain, the commitment to the model of personal capitalism, that had been so successful at the time of the first industrial revolution continued. While long-term profits based on long-term growth were a goal on which the managers and the major investors of the American (and German) managerial firms could agree, the families owning the British firms often preferred to pay out earning in dividends rather than using them to make the extensive investments required to move into foreign markets or to develop new products in related industries. “Because their firms grew slowly and because they hired only a small numbers of managers, the founders and their families remained influential in the affairs of the enterprise and so affected dividend policy” (Chandler 1990 p. 595). By contrast, the long-term growth of American firms helped the managers to gain strong job rights in their firms. “Such a goal not only helped to assure tenure for the senior
executives, but it also enhanced the opportunity for advancement for the more junior managers” (Chandler 1990 p. 595). British firms did not provide similar opportunities to non-owning managers. The key managerial positions were usually reserved for the owning family. Social and family ties were more important than competence to advance on the managerial ladder. There were few opportunities for junior managers while no job security similar to those of American firms could be given to senior executives. According to Chandler, the organizational capabilities that were so important for the firms of the second industrial revolution stagnated and Britain lost her economic leadership. 

Franks et al. (2005 p. 605) qualify this account given by Chandler. They argue that, at the beginning of the last century, the dominance of British families was more evident in terms of control than in terms of ownership. They argue that at that time:

The observations on the dominance of families in the running of firms are a reflection of their board representation rather than their ownership. Board participation by families became disproportionate to their ownership stakes. There were good reasons for being concerned about this development. The divergence between ownership and control undermined the efficient running of corporations as documented by Chandler.

However, the capital of the families got so diluted that some of the usual “continental” defenses against takeovers emerged. The British corporate governance system “for a brief period in 1950s and 1960s began to resemble that of Continental Europe” (Franks et al. 2005 p. 164). Eventually the overwhelming political preponderance of the City blocked that solution.

It was therefore the financial sector that prevented the United Kingdom from drifting into a Continental-style corporate structure with dual-class shares, pyramids and limitations on take-overs…. The financial sector also prevented the corporate sector from erecting the takeover defences, in particular poison pills that became common place in the United States.

(Franks et al. 2005 p. 164)

Eventually, Britain ended up with a corporate system with a limited family ownership but with a financial sector much more concentrated and powerful than that existing in the United States. Financial fragmentation remained a distinctive US characteristic.

The divide between American and British corporate governance becomes even wider when we consider the role of trade unions and the system of social protection. Because of the aristocratic origins of its industrial society, British workers developed immediately (Thompson 1960) a strong sense of class identity and very powerful trade unions. After the last World War, while the degree of concentration of ownership was quickly decreasing, British trade unions held their centralized power as well as their political strength. They had even the
capability of provoking the fall of a government (as happened in 1974 when the miners’ strike caused the end of Edward Heath’s government). Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s, ownership had become dispersed while unions’ power was highly concentrated. This “disequilibrium” was also associated with conflictual industrial relations and low productivity and, somehow, confirms Roe’s (2003) hypothesis that dispersed ownership may be incompatible with strong unions. This disequilibrium lasted until the 1980s when Margaret Thatcher weakened the powers of the unions – a policy that, after 1997, was not substantially reversed by Tony Blair. In this way, Britain has settled to a new equilibrium where a system of partial dispersion of ownership meets a partial weakening of the powers of the unions. This “new equilibrium” makes, at the moment, Britain the economy closest to the US in terms of employment protection and ownership dispersion. However the closeness is too recent and the divide between the two countries is still too wide to talk about a unique “Anglo-Saxon” model of corporate governance. At the moment, the aristocratic and democratic origins of the two models continue to be relevant.

The relationship between politics and corporate governance

The US and Britain define only one segment of the line describing the inverse relation between dispersion of ownership and employment protection in all the OECD countries. Roe (2003) observes that countries with strong “social democracies” and characterized by strong employees’ rights tend to exhibit a strong and concentrated corporate ownership structure. This empirical finding turns out to be robust to a variety of proxies for the degrees of “social democracy” and of ownership dispersion (Roe 2003; Belloc and Pagano 2009). Figure 9.1 (taken from Belloc and Pagano 2009) plots an index of employment protection against an index of ownership dispersion for a sample of 20 OECD countries.21 As is apparent from the fitted regression line, there is a significant negative cross-country correlation between the degree of protection of workers’ rights and the degree of corporate ownership dispersion.

Continental Europe and Japan cluster in the north-west quadrant (strong employment protection legislation and concentrated ownership), the extreme positions being occupied by France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.22 At the other extreme (with the lowest degree of protection of employees’ rights and the highest degree of ownership dispersion) is placed the US.

A possible interpretation of this phenomenon is offered by Roe (2003), who suggests a causality relation that moves from the current political conditions of capitalist countries to corporate governance forms. In Roe’s approach, the separation of ownership and control, which characterizes many American large firms, is not due to “better” corporate laws that protect minority shareholders, and even less to the different legal origins which characterize the different countries. In his view, it is rather due to the absence of a “social democratic” political pressure that, in absence of strong and present owners, would induce managers to collude with employees.
In Belloc and Pagano (2009), we stress the importance of a second direction of causation that moves from corporate governance forms to politics. Family dynastic-based systems of corporate governance may induce social democratic reactions while the latter are weaker in systems where management jobs are open to a large section of the population. This second direction of causation implies the possibility of processes of cumulative causation whereby initial political conditions, influencing the system of corporate governance, re-shape the political and economic environment in a highly path-dependent way. “Political origins” (or “political roots” to use the subtitle of the classic 1994 Roe book) may then play an important role in setting these different patterns of cumulative causation.

Summarizing the results of the comparison between the two tales of emergence of the two prevailing organizational forms of capitalism: we have speculated that “democratic” political origins have pushed the US to tame the concentration of ownership and to limit (more indirectly than directly) a social-democratic reaction and the creation of strong safeguards in favor of labor. In the case of “aristocratic origins”, common to the other European countries, this concentration of ownership took place and generated a wide variety of “social democratic reactions”.

However, we have seen that, in the case of England, the process can be partially reversed. A country with a governance system characterized by “aristocratic origins” may move toward an equilibrium that is the closest to that
prevailing in the United States. Thus, while we have emphasized the exception-
alism of the US democratic origins, it is certainly possible (even if far from
easy) for countries to betray the fate “dictated” by their “political origins”. In the
introduction, we mentioned how strong is the attraction of the US model for
other countries and we argued that different corporate models were associated
with different safeguards, which could stimulate different types of investment
and production activities. Referring to Figure 9.1, can one argue that this variety
of models of capitalism is going to be squeezed, like England, toward the US
extreme?

Perhaps, a global economy may force countries to converge to a unique
model independently of their “aristocratic” or “democratic” origins or, in other
words, globalization may imply the “end of history of corporate governance”
because models different from the (Anglo?-) American model will be inevitably
out competed.

However, one can also argue that a global economy entails that each country
may specialize in those sectors where the safeguards of its corporate governance
system are more appropriate. It is likely that both forces (and many others) are at
work in the global economy. It is difficult to generalize whether globalization
implies disregarding or rediscovering political origins.

The break line of different organizational forms in Europe’s south-east at first
sight seems to run between different concepts: the contradiction between the
production units’ managers and the owners of means of production does not
appear to be of prime significance there. Taking modern Turkey as an example
there rather seems to be a difference between organizations institutionalized ide-
ologically, e.g. political Islam, with socioeconomic goals taken on board as side-
constraints, and organizations originating from a proper commonality in direct
power, either directly coercive (e.g. the army), or economic (e.g. the large firm
owners). For the second variety ideological goals beyond local profit maximiza-
tion are constraints enforced by outside political forces. A similar structure,
though with different proportions, can be found in most West-Balkan states too.
Above all, there never has been a bourgeois revolution like in France or England,
so the collective memory of societies misses a point of reference from where to
differentiate further refinements of the core machinery of capitalism – like a
more sophisticated design of ownership and control relationships. Having left
the caricature of the communist dream behind (ex-Yugoslavia), or having got
stuck in a deadlock between militarily organized secularism and renewed polit-
ical Islam (Turkey), these countries cannot simply join the quest for more demo-
cratic organizational forms along the lines of the Western European debate. With
respect to corporate governance what can be observed in these countries is a lay-
ering of elements: (i) there is the large group of traditional, small production
units without any complicated governance structure but based on families and
kinship relations; (ii) there is the group of state directed production units lead by
representatives of the “state fraction of the ruling class” (compare Chapter 6),
which governs by a system of more or less hierarchical regulation; (iii) an
important and very specific layer is occupied by administration of the energy
sector which in several cases is run directly by state agencies;\textsuperscript{24} (iv) as a considerable part of the population of south-east countries emigrated to the USA (or Australia), there exist tightly knit international communities of ex-patriots organizing medium- and large-sized production units (hybrids of Anglo-Saxon models and local organization forms) back home; (v) there is a growing share of business organized by the global players in the world of transnational corporations which are examples of the Anglo-Saxon model. The borderlines between these layers evidently are rather fluid, and each layer also carries some country-specific properties.

But while this situation first seems to be hardly comparable to Western political economy, there is a similarity at a deeper level: democratic progress proceeds by increased contradictions. Just like the politically unopposed takeover of industry by the former feudal aristocracy in Western Europe provoked the reactions of unions and “social-democracy”, which in the end led to a more democratic governance structure, the concentration of political power in the hands of military and/or religious authorities in South-east Europe today can provoke emancipatory movements with radical aspirations. A major problem of such a positive outlook is that these rising contradictions are diverse and come in many different formats, a fact which makes it difficult to develop a common denominator for counter-movements,\textsuperscript{25} in particular with respect to corporate governance. In this area some mix of the advantages of the higher flexibilities and reduced accountability in layer (i) with the opposite properties of Anglo-Saxon style in layers (iv) and (v) hopefully can provide a new combination, a new organizational form. Perhaps the particularly sharp contrasts to be overcome can even lead to a particularly great jump forward in democratic governance – there must be hope at the bottom of Pandora’s Box.

Notes

1 On the Berle and Means public company the present article draws from Pagano (2012).
2 See Gramsci (1930 (1999)).
3 An ample overview of the corporate governance systems of the different countries see the essays contained in Morck (2005). Corporate systems with concentrated ownership are considered in Morck (2006).
4 This expression is meant of be equivalent to “political roots” appearing in the subtitle of the classic 1994 book by Mark Roe, which is an important ingredient of our story.
5 In the fourth section we will see that there has been a considerable variety of aristocratic political and social origins.
8 This point is developed in Pagano (2000).
9 According to Ernest Gellner (1983) these social and cultural barriers characterized all ancient agrarian societies. Industrialization was associated with cultural homogenization and nationalism that allowed individuals to be more horizontally and vertically mobile. On Gellner’s contribution to political economy see Pagano (2003).
direction of causation from ownership, organization and organizational form to technology turns out to be stronger than the reverse.

11 In the Restoration period a Bourbon King reigned again (1815–30) and, even after, for a long time, the aristocracy commanded a considerable social prestige.

12 In the (rather extreme) words of Tocqueville (1994, p. 222; the last revised edition of his book was in 1848): “No great democratic republic. It would be an insult to republics to use that name for the oligarchy which ruled France in 1793. Only the United States presents this new phenomenon”.

13 Federalist number 51 quoted by Hofstadter (1967).

14 Hofstadter (1967 Ch. II).

15 Lincoln’s Peoria Speech quoted by Hofstadter (1967 p. 112). The point, that slavery should not be extended to new territories, could unite all the anti-slavery individuals independently of the fact that they were abolitionists or “Negrophobes”.

16 Mr Justice Burton, one of the Justices dissenting with the majority decision of the court observed:

The Court’s decision is far reaching. Over 40 years after the enactment of the Clayton Act, it now becomes apparent for the first time that Section 7 has been a sleeping giant all along. Every corporation which has acquired a stock interest in another corporation after the enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914, and which has had business dealings with that corporation is exposed, retroactively, to the bite of the newly discovered teeth of Section 7.

17 The term “tunnelling” is introduced by Johnson et al. (2000) and refers to the act of transferring value from one pyramid firm to another of the same group. Tunnelling lifts assets and income from lower to higher firms (which are controlled by the family) and moves losses and liabilities in the opposite direction. Morck et al. (2005) observe that it is analogous to what multinationals do with transfer prices to avoid taxes.

18 This is the subtitle of Barrington Moore (1973).

19 See, for instance, La Porta et al. (1998).

20 In this respect, Florence (1953) gives a vivid picture of the persistence of the British aristocratic roots in corporate governance. In the 1930s there was still a massive presence of peers in the Directorates of British companies.

21 Given a sample of ten medium-sized firms with stock market capitalization in 1995, Ownership is an index that equals one if there is no controlling shareholder and zero otherwise. EPL stands for employment protection legislation and is averaged over the period 1993–2002. More detailed information on the variables can be found in Belloc and Pagano (2009).

22 Also Nordic countries, like Sweden, which have in the past years had a fairly dynamic economy, occupy the north-western quadrant. The high ownership concentration of Sweden and its relation with social democracy are discussed in Hogfeldt (2004).

23 Becht and DeLong (2005) introduce their interesting paper by considering the two (related) sources of American exceptionalism:

A century ago European academics like Werner Sombart worried why the United States was exceptional in that it did not have socialism. Today we academics worry about a different form of American exceptionalism: why is there so little block holding in the United States?

24 In countries of the former Eastern bloc this sector was responsible for the economic link to the USSR, the exchange of energy from Russia for domestic products. It therefore had to handle external relations of top government and typically included personnel of high-ranked secret service. After the collapse of the Soviet empire in the newly emerged Eastern European states large parts of this administrative cluster remained
intact and still drive its corporate governance. In Turkey and Greece a comparable situation emerged as far as the energy support lines between the Near East and European demand run through these countries.

The best examples for this type of confusing varieties of aspirations currently can be found in the countries of the Arab Spring that threatens to turn into an Islamic Winter.

References


Perspectives

Hardy Hanappi

At the end of this walk through these selected areas of the evolution of Europe’s south-east the emerging mosaic at first sight might look somewhat chaotic. The different countries look very different; their common history seems to be a mess governed mostly by random moves of global political dynamics; even their cultural heritage appears to be more a source for conflict than a binding element. Nevertheless the spotlights thrown on the different elements of their common evolution should also have convinced the reader that there is a common problem, an overarching problem, more precisely a problem of a common European policy to be designed and executed as soon as possible.

Before World War I the Osman Empire had been called the “sick man at the Bosporus”. Its demise had been predicted and it indeed followed soon. Fortunately enough, and perhaps surprising for some less-informed commentators, the current state of affairs in Europe’s south-east is not at all comparable to the situation before World War I. Instead of two self-assured but outdated feudal political regimes (Austria-Hungary and the Osman Empire) there now exists a variety of forms of political governance, partly overlapping and overlapped by European and international institutions. To be sure, this mixture of political forces can still be explosive and will not be easy to steer toward less troubled waters. Moreover there is no mighty cox in sight; no single South-east European country is able to take the lead to frame the future development. This agitated bunch of small- and medium-sized countries is always good for surprises – and this has its positive side since it sometimes breeds social innovations, though usually on a smaller social scale.²

Seen from a European point of view the main problem of South-east Europe can thus be expressed as the need for an agent strong enough to provide such a common perspective, an agent that on the other hand is “weak” enough, i.e. non-authoritarian, democratically organized enough, to integrate many of the aspirations that emerge in this hotbed of European culture. It thus is an extremely difficult role that such a leading political entity will have to play – and there is only one candidate that can take on this challenge: the European Union.

Seen from a different angle, it has to be doubted that the current institutional and personal setup of the European Union, the state it is in, has the capacity to
attack this difficult task. In other words, the problems to be solved in Europe’s south-east are a test for the viability and further progressive evolution of the European Union. The EU cannot circumvent these obstacles, and when it fails to change several of its current features then it will fail to provide good governance for its south-east part. In that case it will be doomed to degenerate and its very existence will be called into question. Though which features are needed for the democratic governance of a continent, of half a billion people, is not a trivial question. Some guidelines for the tracks to follow have nevertheless already emerged, mostly as a kind of panic reaction of the ECB and some other central institutions and committees.\(^3\)

One common denominator probably is the insight that the very existence of a larger political entity implies its competence to organize transfers from the economically stronger parts of its domain to its weaker parts.\(^4\) As an immediate consequence, there has to be a rapid accumulation of fiscal power in the hands of the European Union which in turn implies a weakening of national governments in that respect. It is evident that the strongest nation states, e.g. Germany, will build up most resistance against this necessity.

Another feature of future governance also emerged as a reaction on the financial crisis, namely a democratic control of large financial intermediaries, *vulgo* private banks. At the end of this road toward more regulation there is the insight that large-scale financial intermediation (e.g. between generations, between nations) is a political process that is part of overall democratic governance\(^5\) – and not a playing ground for personal entrepreneurial “animal spirit”.

What has been learned in the Greek case is that there also is an urgent need for more elaborated control of national and regional bureaucracy and administration. In economic theory the notion of hold-up cost, i.e. payments enforced by the threat of *not* administering a certain task (in time), is well established; but operational proposals how to eliminate this socially destructive practice are rare. In such an enormous political entity like Europe the sheer amounts of money flows running through the hands of administrative personnel are always enticing.\(^6\) This type of control mechanisms, in particular when electronic money transfer is the rule, still is mostly *terra incognita* and has to be developed rapidly.

Finally what has been learned from the explosion of unemployment rates, in particular from youth unemployment, has to be turned into a conscious and continuous education policy of Europe. Instead of internal and external build-up of coercive power – internally disguised as “security policy”, externally justified as a NATO expansion necessary to democratize the East – European people urgently need publicly financed education programs that enable Europe to find its place in the global division of labor.\(^7\) South-east Europe would be a perfect example for such a shift of emphasis in public expenditure. And there is probably no other topic where existing nationalisms and the overall European agenda collide more visibly. Perhaps this property makes it to a particularly well-suited starting point to convince young European citizens in Europe’s south-east of the desirability of a common Europe.
These perspectives do not promise certainties, they just express options. But these options are becoming clearer every week, the possible downsides if chances are missed are often immediately experienced. A European learning process has started, and to some extent it will be learning the hard way – in particular at its center: Europe’s south-east.

Notes

1 Outstanding examples are the conflict on the name “Macedonia” between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia and the deeply ingrained – though historically unjustified – cultural divide felt by many Turkish and Greek inhabitants. A similar misuse of exaggerated differences in cultural traits has been observed during the Yugoslavian War; in that case between Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, and Albanians.

2 Think of bargaining techniques or only vaguely formalized bureaucratic loop-hole techniques helping to overcome difficulties that would kill any too rigid bureaucratic system.

3 Compare also Hanappi (2013) for a similar, though more detailed, argument.

4 The word “solidarity”, which is sometimes used to characterize this property, is somewhat misleading since it suggests an element of voluntary, morally motivated willingness to do these transfers. For the unifying strength of political authority no benevolence is needed, it simply is the raison d’être of a political entity.

5 The proposed banking union is a first, though only a timid step in that direction. The landslide caused by breakdowns of banking competences (including the consequences for European labor markets) is still pending. The hope is that a quickly implemented emergency plan – promoting ECB control – will prevent the worst. Of course, the ECB itself has to become a more democratically legitimated institution in time.

6 Moreover today’s money is just a momentous glimmering on a screen. To be able to use this flow for a few minutes of speculative investment somewhere else in the world was not an option for anybody some fifty years ago. Today it is, and tomorrow these opportunities might be even more destructive. What used to be called bribery has experienced a quantum jump – not just in Mediterranean countries – but in amounts and in scope.

7 More details on Europe’s place in the global division of labor are developed in Hanappi (2012).

8 In some cases, for example, with respect to several environmental damages, the consequences will take longer to be realized.

References
